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Resumen en castellano
Uno de los principales obstáculos de la migración de las aplicaciones al cloud es la se-
guridad. No tener ningún control sobre cómo viajan nuestros datos a través de Internet
y no conocer quién tiene acceso a ellos, hace que los usuarios sean reacios a adoptar una
estrategia de migración de aplicaciones a cloud públicos. Un ejemplo concreto son las co-
municaciones vía Internet, donde los usuarios pueden requerir comunicarse de una forma
segura y no susceptible de espionaje o interceptación, es decir, sin tener una tercera per-
sona escuchando la conversación. Este trabajo presenta dos arquitecturas de teleconferencia
segura desplegadas en la nube, VPN Secure Cloud Teleconferencing Architecture y Hidden
Server Cloud Teleconferencing Architecture, para abordar las posibles brechas de seguridad
y ataques en las comunicaciones de voz sobre IP (VoIP) en un medio inseguro como Internet.
Además, se propone un modelo representado por un árbol de decisión, en el que un usuario
puede determinar de forma sencilla que arquitectura e infraestructura es la que mejor se
ajusta a sus necesidades a la hora de establecer un servidor de teleconferencia segura en
un cloud público. Este trabajo está organizado en tres partes: en la primera se presenta la
motivación cientíﬁca y el planteamiento del proyecto: el desarollo de arquitecturas capaces
de hacer frente a los problemas de seguridad de las comunicaciones vía Internet; en la se-
gunda, se detalla el proceso de despliegue de dichas arquitecturas y sus características; y
en la tercera y última se presentan algunas de las conclusiones obtenidas y se identiﬁcan
futuras líneas de trabajo.
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Abstract
One of the main handicaps about migrating applications to the cloud is security. Having
no control over how our data travels through the Internet and not knowing who has access
to them, make users reluctant to adopt a public cloud migration strategy. Communications
over the Internet are a concrete example where users may need to communicate in a secure
way not susceptible to eavesdropping or interception, i.e. not having a third party to listen
in. In this document, two new secure teleconferencing architectures deployed in the cloud are
presented, Teleconferencing Secure Cloud VPN Architecture and Hidden Teleconferencing
Server Cloud Architecture, to address possible security breaches and attacks in voice over
IP (VoIP) communications in an unsafe environment such as the Internet. In addition,
a model represented by a decision tree is proposed, in which a user can easily determine
which architecture and infrastructure is the one that best ﬁts his needs when establishing
a secure teleconference server on a public cloud. This paper is organized in three parts:
part I presents the scientiﬁc motivation and approach to the project: the development of
architectures able to address security issues in Internet communications; in part II, the
deployment of these architectures and their characteristics are detailed; and in part III,
some of the conclusions are presented and future lines of research identiﬁed.
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Part I
Motivation and objectives
2

Chapter 1
Introduction
Before cloud computing emergence, particular responsibilities of executives at large compa-
nies included making sure that all of the employees had the right hardware and software
they needed to do their jobs. Buying computers for everyone was not enough. They also had
to purchase software or software licenses to give employees the tools they required. Now,
in the cloud computing era, instead of installing a suite of software for each computer, this
executive would only have to load one application. This application would allow workers to
log into a Web-based service which hosts all the programs the user would need for his or
her job. Remote machines owned by another company would run everything from e-mail to
word processing to complex data analysis programs.
In a cloud computing system, there is a signiﬁcant workload shift. Local computers no
longer have to do all the heavy lifting when it comes to running applications. The network of
computers that make up the cloud handles them instead. Hardware and software demands
on the user's side decrease. The only thing the user's computer needs to be able to run is
the cloud computing system's interface software, which can be as simple as a Web browser,
and the cloud's network takes care of the rest.
This is not the only beneﬁt of adopting a cloud computing system. Proponents claim
that cloud computing allows companies to avoid upfront infrastructure costs, and focus on
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projects that diﬀerentiate their businesses instead of infrastructure. Proponents also claim
that cloud computing allows enterprises to get their applications up and running faster,
with improved manageability and less maintenance, and enables IT to more rapidly ad-
just resources to meet ﬂuctuating and unpredictable business demand. In addition, cloud
computing provides the tools and technologies to build data/compute intensive parallel
applications with much more aﬀordable prices compared to traditional parallel computing
techniques.
Extra beneﬁts of adopting a business perspective cloud-based are: broad network access
(capabilities are available over the network) and elasticity (capabilities can be elastically
provisioned and released). However, a cloud migration can present numerous challenges
such as performance and raise security concerns.
Cloud communications are Internet-based voice and data communications where telecom-
munications applications, switching and storage are hosted by a third-party outside of the
organization using them, and they are accessed over the public Internet. Most traditional
communications media including telephone, music, ﬁlm, and television are being reshaped
or redeﬁned by the Internet, giving birth to new services such as voice over Internet Protocol
(VoIP). Cloud communications providers deliver voice & data communications applications
and services, hosting them on servers that the providers own and maintain, giving their
customers access to the "cloud". Because they only pay for services or applications they
use, customers have a more cost-eﬀective, reliable and secure communications environment,
without the headaches associated with more conventional PBX system deployment. In short,
companies can cut costs with cloud communications services without sacriﬁcing features.
5
In cloud-based communications, security is a big issue that needs to be addressed. When
a communication is established, people want to communicate in a way not susceptible to
eavesdropping or interception, not having a third party to listen in. Furthermore, com-
munication data travels through the Internet, having no control over how our data travels
through the Internet and not knowing who has access to them. Security measures have to be
taken to prevent attacks to communications and keep data and conversation conﬁdentiality.
6

Chapter 2
Previous Work
In the following chapters a general overview about cloud computing and communications is
given, emphasising on security and performance issues. First, a preliminary training about
the Internet is presented, analysing each of its layers. After that, a brief communication
state of the art is shown, focusing on VoIP communications and its security breaches. Also,
the most used VoIP software are introduced, comparing their features and proprietary pro-
tocols. Then, speech quality measure methods are analysed, highlighting its advantages
and disadvantages against the others and studying correlation with subjective methods to
establish a speech quality estimator.
Due to communication security issues, possible communication security breaches and
attacks, current possible secure solutions and preventions are summarised. Finally, a short
introduction of cloud computing is given. Diﬀerent cloud layers, services and models ba-
sic principles are introduced, explaining all beneﬁts about cloud migration and possible
drawbacks.
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2.1 Internet communication
2.1.1 The Internet
The Internet is a global system of interconnected computer networks that use the standard
Internet protocol suite (TCP/IP) to serve several billion users worldwide. It is a network
of networks that consists of millions of private, public, academic, business, and government
networks, of local to global scope, that are linked by a broad array of electronic, wireless
and optical networking technologies. The Internet carries an extensive range of information
resources and services, such as the inter-linked hypertext documents of the World Wide Web
(WWW) and the infrastructure to support email.
Most traditional communications media including telephone, music, ﬁlm, and television
are being reshaped or redeﬁned by the Internet, giving birth to new services such as voice
over Internet Protocol (VoIP) and Internet Protocol television (IPTV). Newspaper, book
and other print publishing are adapting to Web site technology, or are reshaped into blogging
and web feeds. The Internet has enabled and accelerated new forms of human interactions
through instant messaging, Internet forums, and social networking. Online shopping has
boomed both for major retail outlets and small artisans and traders. Business-to-business
and ﬁnancial services on the Internet aﬀect supply chains across entire industries.
The Internet has no centralized governance in either technological implementation or
policies for access and usage; each constituent network sets its own policies. Only the over-
reaching deﬁnitions of the two principal name spaces in the Internet, the Internet Protocol
address space and the Domain Name System, are directed by a maintainer organization, the
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). The technical underpin-
ning and standardization of the core protocols (IPv4 and IPv6) is an activity of the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF), a non-proﬁt organization of loosely aﬃliated international
participants that anyone may associate with by contributing technical expertise.
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The Internet Protocol Suite is the networking model and a set of communications proto-
cols used for the Internet and similar networks. It is commonly known as TCP/IP, because
its most important protocols, the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and the Internet
Protocol (IP) were the ﬁrst networking protocols deﬁned in this standard.
Figure 2.1: Equivalence of TCP/IP model to OSI model. It is also illustrated some of the
most used protocols according to each layer.
The Internet protocol suite provides end-to-end connectivity specifying how data should
be formatted, addressed, transmitted, routed and received at the destination. These re-
strictions and formats where stipulated in RFC1 1122 (Requirements for Internet Hosts 
Communication Layers, R. Braden (ed.), October 1989) and RFC 1123 (Requirements for
Internet Hosts  Application and Support, R. Braden (ed.), October 1989)[9][10]. It has
1A Request for Comments (RFC) is a publication of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and
the Internet Society, the principal technical development and standards-setting bodies for the Internet. An
RFC is authored by engineers and computer scientists in the form of a memorandum describing methods,
behaviors, research, or innovations applicable to the working of the Internet and Internet-connected systems.
It is submitted either for peer review or simply to convey new concepts, information, or (occasionally)
engineering humor. The IETF adopts some of the proposals published as RFCs as Internet standards.
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four abstraction layers [Figure 2.1] which are used to sort all related protocols according
to the scope of networking involved. This abstraction also allows upper layers to provide
services that the lower layers do not provide These layers are deﬁned from lowest to highest
as follows:
• Network Access (Link Layer): This layer deﬁnes the networking methods within
the scope of the local network link on which hosts communicate without intervening
routers. This layer describes the protocols used to describe the local network topology
and the interfaces needed to eﬀect transmission of Internet layer datagrams to next-
neighbour hosts. The TCP/IP model's link layer corresponds to the Open Systems
Interconnection2 (OSI) model physical and data link layers, layers one and two of the
OSI model [Figure 2.1].
• Internet Layer: The internet layer has the task of exchanging datagrams across
network boundaries. It is therefore also referred to as the layer that establishes inter-
networking, indeed, it deﬁnes and establishes the Internet. This layer deﬁnes the
addressing and routing structures used for the TCP/IP protocol suite. The primary
protocol in this scope is the Internet Protocol, which deﬁnes IP addresses. Its function
in routing is to transport datagrams to the next IP router that has the connectivity
to a network closer to the ﬁnal data destination.
• Transport Layer (host-to-host): The transport layer constitutes the networking
regime between two network hosts, either on the local network or on remote networks
separated by routers. The transport layer provides a uniform networking interface
that hides the actual topology (layout) of the underlying network connections. This
2The Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model (ISO/IEC 7498-1) is a conceptual model that character-
izes and standardizes the internal functions of a communications system by partitioning it into abstraction
layers. The model is a product of the Open Systems Interconnection project at the International Organiza-
tion for Standardization (ISO). The model groups similar communication functions into one of seven logical
layers. A layer serves the layer above it and is served by the layer below it. Two instances at one layer
are connected by a horizontal connection on that layer. These seven layers are: Physical Layer, Data Link
Layer, Network Layer, Transport Layer, Session Layer, Presentation Layer and Application Layer
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is where ﬂow-control, error-correction, and connection protocols exist, such as TCP.
This layer deals with opening and maintaining connections between Internet hosts.
• Application Layer (process-to-process): This is the scope within which applica-
tions create user data and communicate this data to other processes or applications on
another or the same host. The communications partners are often called peers. This
is where the higher level protocols such as SMTP, FTP, SSH, HTTP, etc. operate.
2.1.2 Communication
Communication is the process of sharing ideas, information and messages with others. The
most basic communication methods that are known to man are speech and non-verbal ex-
pressions such as facial expressions and body language. Apart from these basic methods of
communication there are other methods of communication. These methods began to evolve
and become complex as the wants and needs of human beings became complex.
Electronic communication is what expanded the horizons of communication and really
boosted the communication industry. This path was shown to us by the founder of the tele-
phone "Alexander Graham Bell". The telephone was the ﬁrst step towards all the modern
methods of communication such as telephone calls, electronic mail or e-mail, satellite broad-
casting, cable television and the internet. The Internet has become the number one source
of information and communication through out the world. You can see what is happening
while it's happening. The Internet is linked to almost every major organization, business
and government. Miss-communication can cause catastrophic outcomes especially when it
comes to global marketing, ﬁnance, economics, trade and war. Today communication has
reached a multi-sensory level where any and every thing is possible. The simple act of ex-
changing ideas has become one of the most important parts of human life.
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Internet or Online Communication is a form of communication, using several channels
available on the Internet to communicate and interact online to relay a message to a targeted
audience.
As we have already introduced, communication is the most popular use of the Internet,
with email topping the list of all the technologies used. Although most of the technologies
that are unique to the Internet communication are done in text, there is also Internet tele-
phony. Internet telephony is traditional telephone-like communication conducted via the
Internet. There is computer-to-computer and computer-to-phone communication. To use
the Internet for such communication a user needs to have a microphone, a sound card and
speakers.
Chat rooms are communications channels that permit users to write to one another,
"chat," on a particular topic, usually using a speciﬁc user name to be identiﬁed. There are
also instant messaging services for communication with people speciﬁed and approved by
the user. At the beginning of the 21st century many people use cellular or satellite services
to connect to the Internet wirelessly. A number of web-enabled devices are used for wireless
communication such as smartphones, tablets and others.
Internet communications rapidly became more varied and convenient for users as tech-
nology advanced into the 21st century. The types of Internet communication include social
networking sites, where members are able to send messages, links, comments, pictures and
articles to other members of the site. Communication is not limited to the sender and re-
ceiver, but other members who have access to the site of one user can also make comments.
This type of relationship is called an "Internet community".
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Blog and vlog are another type of Internet communication. Blogging is when a person
expresses his or her thoughts, ideas, as well as social and political views, online. Readers of a
blogger's writings can make comments and send their links to other readers. Some bloggers
build a devout group of readers. A vlog is also for sharing thoughts and ideas online, using
digitally recorded sound ﬁles. A user records a vlog on some kind of a digital device and
then uploads it onto the computer to share with viewers.
Online forums and message boards provide users with the opportunity to express their
knowledge or views of a particular subject. Topics for discussion range from sports teams,
political agendas, through home improvement to medical experience and procedures. Cus-
tomers of online retail stores are able to read reviews by other buyers before purchasing
an item and also to rate purchased items. In addition, readers of online news articles can
comment and communicate with other readers as well as with news reporters and editors
through their comments.
These types of communication are not unique to networked computer environments, but
due to much improved accessibility on the Internet, they quickly gained popularity. Later
they have also become accessible through mobile devices with Internet connection. Some
technologies, such as video and audio conferencing and Internet telephony, require more
multimedia capabilities of computer systems.
Several issues related to ethical and legal considerations arise from using the Internet
for communication. The manner in which communication is implemented on the Internet
makes it susceptible to monitoring. We can't assume that communications are private. Some
believe that sending email is like sending a message on a postcard. Some laws have been
enacted to help protect privacy during electronic communications. These, however, have
been diﬃcult to enforce and are rarely applied. One way to protect privacy is to encrypt or
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code a message. A common way of encrypting messages is through the use of public and
private keys. Although software for encryption is readily available, current policies and laws
prohibit its export.
2.1.3 Voice over IP (VoIP)
One of the main kinds of communication through the Internet is Internet telephony. Internet
telephony consists of a combination of hardware and software that enables you to use the
Internet as the transmission medium of communications services (voice, fax, SMS, voice-
messaging) over the public Internet, rather than via the public switched telephone network
(PSTN). In its simplest form, PC-to-PC Internet telephony can be as easy as hooking up a
microphone to your computer and sending your voice through a cable modem to a person
who has Internet telephony software that is compatible with yours. However, this basic
form of Internet telephony is not without its problems. Connecting this way is slower than
using a traditional telephone, and the quality of the voice transmissions is also not near the
quality you would get when placing a regular phone call.
Voice over IP (voice over Internet Protocol, VoIP) is a methodology and group of tech-
nologies for the delivery of voice communications and multimedia sessions over Internet
Protocol (IP) networks, such as the Internet[1]. The steps and principles involved in origi-
nating a VoIP telephone calls are similar to traditional digital telephony, and involve signal-
ing, channel setup, digitization of the analog voice signals, and encoding. Instead of being
transmitted over a circuit-switched network, however, the digital information is packetized
and transmission occurs as Internet Protocol (IP) packets over a packet-switched network.
Such transmission entails careful considerations about resource management diﬀerent from
time-division multiplexing (TDM) networks.
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VoIP systems employ session control and signaling protocols to control the signaling,
set-up, and tear-down of calls. They transport audio streams over IP networks using special
media delivery protocols that encode voice, audio, video with audio codecs and video codecs
as Digital audio by streaming media. Various codecs exist that optimize the media stream
based on application requirements and network bandwidth; some implementations rely on
narrowband and compressed speech, while others support high ﬁdelity stereo codecs. Some
popular codecs included are µ-law and a-law versions of G.711, G.722 which is a high-ﬁdelity
codec marketed as HD Voice by Polycom, a popular open source voice codec known as iLBC,
a codec that only uses 8 kbit/s each way called G.729, G.726, GSM, etc. Nowadays, VoIP is
available on many smartphones, personal computers, and on Internet access devices where
calls and SMS text messages may be sent over 3G or Wi-Fi.
The main organisms that deﬁne Internet and Telecommunication standards are the In-
ternet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and the International Telecommunications Union
(ITU), establishing the VoIP rules and protocols.
Voice over IP has been implemented in various ways using both proprietary protocols, as
well as protocols based on open standards. Some of the most used protocols are described
as follows:
• H.323: This is an ITU-T's (International Telecommunications Union) standard that
vendors should comply while providing Voice over IP service. This recommendation
provides the technical requirements for voice communication over LANs while assum-
ing that no Quality of Service (QoS) is being provided by LANs. It was originally
developed for multimedia conferencing on LANs, but was later extended to cover
Voice over IP. The ﬁrst version was released in 1996 while the second version of H.323
came into eﬀect in January 1998. The standard encompasses both point to point com-
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H.323 SIP MGCP/H.248/Megaco
Standards
body
ITU-T IETF MGCP/Megaco: IETF
H.248: ITU-T
Architecture Distributed Distributed, Peer-to-
Peer
Centralized
Call Control Gatekeeper Proxy/Redirect
Server
Call agent/Media Control
Gateway / Softswitch
Endpoints Gateway, terminal User agent Media Gateway
Signaling
Transport
TCP/UDP TCP/UDP MGCP:UDP
H.248/Megaco: TCP/UDP
Multimedia Yes Yes Yes
DTMF-relay
transport
RTP (Real Time
Transport Protocol)
RTP (Real Time
Transport Protocol)
RTP (Real Time Transport
Protocol)
Fax-relay
transport
T.38 T.38 T.38
Supplemental
services
By endpoints or call
control
By endpoints or call
control
By call agent
Table 2.1: VoIP Standard Protocols.
munications and multipoint conferences. The products and applications of diﬀerent
vendors can interoperate if they abide by the H.323 speciﬁcation. H.323 deﬁnes four
logical components viz., Terminals, Gateways, Gatekeepers and Multipoint Control
Units (MCUs). Terminals, gateways and MCUs are known as endpoints.
• SIP: This is an IETF's standard for establishing VOIP connections. It is an applica-
tion layer control protocol for creating,modifying and terminating sessions with one or
more participants. The architecture of SIP is similar to that of HTTP (client-server
protocol). Requests are generated by the client and sent to the server. The server
processes the requests and then sends a response to the client. A request and the
responses for that request make a transaction. SIP has INVITE and ACK messages
which deﬁne the process of opening a reliable channel over which call control mes-
sages may be passed. SIP makes minimal assumptions about the underlying transport
protocol. This protocol itself provides reliability and does not depend on TCP for
17
reliability. SIP depends on the Session Description Protocol (SDP) for carrying out
the negotiation for codec identiﬁcation. SIP supports session descriptions that allow
participants to agree on a set of compatible media types. It also supports user mobility
by proxying and redirecting requests to the user's current location. Services that SIP
provides are:
 User Location: determination of the end system to be used for communication.
 Call Set-up: ringing and establishing call parameters at both called and calling
party.
 User Availability : determination of the willingness of the called party to engage
in communications.
 User Capabilities : determination of the media and media parameters to be used.
 Call handling : the transfer and termination of calls.
• Media Gateway Control Protocol (MGCP): It is another IETF's standard used
for controlling telephony gateways from external call control elements called media
gateway controllers or call agents. A telephony gateway is a network element that
provides conversion between the audio signals carried on telephone circuits and data
packets carried over the Internet or over other packet networks. MGCP assumes a
call control architecture where the call control intelligence is outside the gateways and
handled by external call control elements. The MGCP assumes that these call control
elements, or Call Agents, will synchronize with each other to send coherent commands
to the gateways under their control. MGCP is, in essence, a master/slave protocol,
where the gateways are expected to execute commands sent by the Call Agents.The
MGCP implements the media gateway control interface as a set of transactions. The
transactions are composed of a command and a mandatory response.
• Megaco/H.248: H.248 or Megaco or Gateway Control Protocol is a recommendation
from ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) which deﬁnes protocols
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that are used between elements of a physically decomposed multimedia gateway. It is
an implementation of the Media Gateway Control Protocol Architecture [16]. H.248
is also called Megaco in IETF domain. It is now known as Gateway Control Protocol.
The current standard published in September 2005 by ITU-T is H.248.1: Gateway
control protocol: Version 3. H.248/Megaco is standard protocol for controlling the
elements of a physically decomposed multimedia gateway, which enables separation of
call control from media conversion. H.248/Megaco is a master/slave protocol used to
separate the call control logic from the media processing logic in a gateway.
Communication on the IP network is perceived less reliable in contrast to the circuit-
switched public telephone network, as it does not provide a network-based mechanism to
ensure that data packets are not lost, and are delivered in sequential order. As IP was
designed for carrying data, so it does not provide real time guarantees but only provides
best eﬀort service. For voice communications over IP to become acceptable to the users,
the delay needs to be less than a threshold value and the IETF (Internet Engineering Task
Force) is working on this aspect. To ensure good quality of voice, we can use either Echo
Cancellation, Packet Prioritization (giving higher priority to voice packets) or Forward Error
Correction. Thus, QoS (Quality of Service) is a major issue in VOIP implementations. The
issue is how to guarantee that packet traﬃc for a voice or other media connection will not be
delayed or dropped due interference from other lower priority traﬃc. Problems to consider
are:
• Latency: Delay for packet delivery.
• Jitter: Variations in delay of packet delivery.
• Packet loss: Too much traﬃc in the network causes the network to drop packets.
• Burstiness of Loss and Jitter: Loss and Discards (due to jitter) tend to occur in
bursts.
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For the end user, large delays are burdensome and can cause bad echos. It is hard to have
a working conversation with too large delays. You keep interrupting each other. Jitter
causes strange sound eﬀects, but can be handled to some degree with "jitter buﬀers" in the
software. Packet loss causes interrupts. Some degree of packet loss won't be noticeable, but
lots of packet loss will make sound lousy.
ITU-T and IETF determine requirements to each point mentioned above in order to
guarantee a minimum quality of service.
In case of latency, callers usually notice round-trip voice delays of 250 ms or more. ITU-T
G.114 recommends a maximum of a 150 ms one-way latency. Since this includes the entire
voice path, part of which may be on the public Internet, your own network should have
transit latencies of considerably less than 150 ms.
Jitter can be measured in several ways. There are jitter measurement calculations de-
ﬁned in IETF RFC 3550 RTP (A Transport Protocol for Real-Time Applications) and IETF
RFC 3611 RTP (Control Protocol Extended Reports - RTCP XR). But, equipment and net-
work vendors often don't detail exactly how they are calculating the values they report for
measured jitter. Most VOIP endpoint devices (e.g. VOIP phones and ATAs) have jitter
buﬀers to compensate for network jitter. Jitter buﬀers (used to compensate for varying
delay) further add to the end-to-end delay, and are usually only eﬀective on delay variations
less than 100 ms. Jitter must therefore be minimized.
VOIP is not tolerant of packet loss. Even 1% packet loss can "signiﬁcantly degrade" a
VOIP call using a G.711 codec and other more compressing codecs can tolerate even less
packet loss.Reference to CISCO For example, according to CISCO Systems Inc, the de-
fault G.729 codec requires packet loss far less than 1 percent to avoid audible errors.
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A number of protocols have been deﬁned to support the reporting of quality of service
(QoS) and quality of experience (QoE) for VoIP calls. These include RTCP Extended Re-
port (RFC 3611), SIP RTCP Summary Reports, H.460.9, H.248.30 and MGCP extensions.
The RFC 3611 VoIP Metrics block is generated by an IP phone or gateway during a live
call and contains information on packet loss rate, packet discard rate (because of jitter),
packet loss/discard burst metrics (burst length/density, gap length/density), network delay,
end system delay, signal / noise / echo level, Mean Opinion Scores (MOS) and R factors
and conﬁguration information related to the jitter buﬀer.
RFC 3611 VoIP metrics reports are exchanged between IP endpoints on an occasional
basis during a call, and an end of call message sent via SIP RTCP Summary Report or one
of the other signaling protocol extensions. RFC 3611 VoIP metrics reports are intended to
support real time feedback related to QoS problems, the exchange of information between
the endpoints for improved call quality calculation and a variety of other applications.
Then, some of the most used and popular VoIP software both proprietary and open
source are described. In Figure 2.2 is shown the top VoIP software applications in mobile
broadband.
2.1.3.1 Asterisk
Asterisk is an open source framework for building communications applications. Asterisk
turns an ordinary computer into a communications server. Asterisk powers IP PBX systems,
VoIP gateways, conference servers and other custom solutions. It is used by small businesses,
large businesses, call centres, carriers and government agencies, worldwide. Asterisk is free
and open source. Like any PBX, it allows attached telephones to make calls to one another,
and to connect to other telephone services, such as the public switched telephone network
(PSTN) and Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) services. The Asterisk project started in
21
Figure 2.2: Top VoIP software applications in mobile broadband in 2011.
1999 when Mark Spencer released the initial code under the GPL open source license. Since
that time, it has been enhanced and tested by a global community of thousands. Today,
Asterisk is maintained by the combined eﬀorts of Digium and the Asterisk community.
Asterisk is released under a dual license model, using the GNU General Public License
(GPL) as a free software license and a proprietary software license to permit licensees to
distribute proprietary, unpublished system components. Originally designed for Linux, As-
terisk also runs on a variety of diﬀerent operating systems including NetBSD, OpenBSD,
FreeBSD, Mac OS X, and Solaris.
Asterisk supports a wide range of Voice over IP protocols, including the Session Initi-
ation Protocol (SIP), the Media Gateway Control Protocol (MGCP), and H.323. Asterisk
can interoperate with most SIP telephones, acting both as registrar and as a gateway be-
tween IP phones and the PSTN. The Inter-Asterisk eXchange (IAX2) protocol, RFC 5456,
native to Asterisk, provides eﬃcient trunking of calls among Asterisk PBXes, in addition to
distributed conﬁguration logic, and call completion to VoIP service providers who support
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it. Some telephones support the IAX2 protocol directly. By supporting a mix of traditional
and VoIP telephony services, Asterisk allows deployers to build new telephone systems, or
gradually migrate existing systems to new technologies. Some sites are using Asterisk servers
to replace proprietary PBXes; others to provide additional features (such as voice mail or
voice response menus, or virtual call shops) or to reduce costs by carrying long-distance calls
over the Internet (toll bypass).
Asterisk was one of the ﬁrst open source PBX software packages. In addition to VoIP
protocols, Asterisk supports many traditional circuit-switching protocols such as ISDN and
SS7. This requires appropriate hardware interface cards supporting such protocols, marketed
by third-party vendors. Each protocol requires the installation of software modules. With
these features, Asterisk provides a wide spectrum of communications options.
2.1.3.2 Skype
Skype is a proprietary Voice over IP service and software application3. Skype was ﬁrst
released in 2005 written by Estonian developers Monish Mohan, Priit Kasesalu, and Jaan
Tallinn, Danish Janus Friis, and Swedish Niklas Zennström, who had also originally devel-
oped Kazaa4. It developed into a platform with over 600 million users.
The service allows users to communicate with peers by voice using a microphone, video
by using a webcam, and instant messaging over the Internet. Phone calls may be placed
to recipients on the traditional telephone networks. Calls to other users within the Skype
3www.skype.com
4Kazaa initially was a peer-to-peer ﬁle sharing application using the FastTrack protocol licensed by
Joltid Ltd. and operated as Kazaa by Sharman Networks, but since August 2012, the Kazaa website is no
longer active. Kazaa was subsequently under license as a legal music subscription service by Atrinsic, Inc.
Kazaa Media Desktop was commonly used to exchange MP3 music ﬁles and other ﬁle types, such as videos,
applications, and documents over the internet. The Kazaa Media Desktop client could be downloaded free
of charge; however, it was bundled with adware and for a period there were "No spyware" warnings found
on Kazaa's website. During the past few years, Sharman Networks and its business partners and associates
were the target of copyright-related lawsuits, related to the copyright of content distributed via Kazaa Media
Desktop on the FastTrack protocol.
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Figure 2.3: International Telephone and Skype Traﬃc, 2005-2012.
service are free of charge, while calls to landline telephones and mobile phones are charged
via a debit-based user account system. Skype has also become popular for its additional
features, including ﬁle transfer, and videoconferencing.
Unlike most other VoIP services, Skype is a hybrid peer-to-peer and clientserver sys-
tem. It makes use of background processing on computers running Skype software. Skype's
original proposed name (Sky Peer-to-Peer) reﬂects this fact.
In January 2011, after the release of video calling on the Skype client for iPhone, Skype
reached a record 27 million simultaneous online users. This record was broken with 29
million simultaneous online users on 21 February 2011, and again on 28 March 2011 with
30 million online users. On 25 February 2012, Skype announced that it has over 32 million
users for the ﬁrst time ever. As of 5 March 2012, it has broken to 36 million simultaneous
online users and less than a year later, on 21 January 2013, Skype had more than 50 million
concurrent users online. In June 2012, Skype had surpassed 70 million downloads on an
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Figure 2.4: Analysis of the impact of Skype and consumer VoIP services on international
calling.
Android Device. On 19 July 2012, Microsoft announced that Skype users had logged 115
billion minutes of calls over the quarter, up 50% since the last quarter.
Skype uses a proprietary Internet telephony (VoIP) network called the Skype protocol.
The protocol has not been made publicly available by Skype and oﬃcial applications using
the protocol are closed-source. Part of the Skype technology relies on the Global Index P2P
protocol belonging to the Joltid Ltd. corporation. The main diﬀerence between Skype and
standard VoIP clients is that Skype operates on a peer-to-peer model (originally based on
the Kazaa software), rather than the more usual clientserver model (note that the very
popular SIP model of VoIP is also peer-to-peer, but implementation generally requires reg-
istration with a server, as does Skype). As far as networking stack support, Skype currently
only supports the IPv4 protocol and it lacks support for the next generation Internet pro-
tocol, IPv6.
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Skype uses as audio codecs G.729 and SVOPC. Moreover, Skype added a Skype-created
codec called SILK to Skype 4.0 for Windows and other Skype clients, being intended to be
"lightweight and embeddable".
Security is the main question to be resolved about Skype. Skype is claimed to be a se-
cure communication.Skype reportedly uses publicly documented, widely trusted encryption
techniques: RSA5 for key negotiation and the Advanced Encryption Standard to encrypt
conversations. However, it is impossible to verify that these algorithms are used correctly,
completely and at all times as there is no public review possible without a protocol speciﬁca-
tion and/or the program source code. Skype provides an uncontrolled registration system for
users with no proof of identity. Instead, a free choice of nicknames permits users to use the
system without revealing their identity to other users. It is trivial to set up an account using
any name; the displayed caller's name is no guarantee of authenticity. A third party paper
analyzing the security and methodology of Skype was presented at Black Hat Europe 2006
[8]. It analyzed Skype and found a number of security issues with the current security model.
Skype incorporates some features, which tend to hide its traﬃc, but it is not speciﬁcally
designed to thwart traﬃc analysis and therefore does not provide anonymous communica-
tion. Some researchers have been able to watermark the traﬃc so that it is identiﬁable even
after passing through an anonymizing network [46]. For example, in November 2010, a ﬂaw
was disclosed to Skype that showed how hackers could secretly track any user's IP address.
As of 2013, this still has not been ﬁxed [25].
5RSA is an algorithm for public-key cryptography that is based on the presumed diﬃculty of factoring
large integers, the factoring problem. RSA stands for Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adleman, who
ﬁrst publicly described the algorithm in 1977. Cliﬀord Cocks, an English mathematician, had developed an
equivalent system in 1973, but it was not declassiﬁed until 1997. A user of RSA creates and then publishes
the product of two large prime numbers, along with an auxiliary value, as their public key. The prime factors
must be kept secret. Anyone can use the public key to encrypt a message, but with currently published
methods, if the public key is large enough, only someone with knowledge of the prime factors can feasibly
decode the message. Whether breaking RSA encryption is as hard as factoring is an open question known
as the RSA problem.
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2.1.3.3 Google+ Hangouts
Google+ Hangouts is an instant messaging and video chat platform developed by Google,
which launched on May 15, 2013 during the keynote of its I/O development conference. It
replaced three messaging products that Google had implemented concurrently within its
services, including Talk, Google+ Messenger, and Hangouts, a video chat system present
within Google+6.
Hangouts allows users to hold conversations between two or more users. The service
can be accessed online through the Gmail or Google+ websites, or through mobile applica-
tions available for Android and iOS (which were distributed as a successor to their existing
Google Talk applications). However, because it uses a proprietary protocol instead of the
XMPP open standard protocol used by Google Talk, most third-party applications which
had access to Google Talk do not have access to Google+ Hangouts. There are, for example,
no free software clients for Google+ Hangouts.
One advantage of Google+ Hangouts is that chat histories are saved online, allowing
them to be synced between devices. A "watermark" of a user's avatar is used as a marker
to indicate how far they have read into the conversation. Photos can be shared during
conversations, which are automatically uploaded into a private Google+ album. Users can
also now use emoticons symbols in their messages. As with the previous Google+ Hangouts,
users can also perform a group video chat with up to 10 users at a time. Nikhyl Singhal,
Google's director of real-time communications, stated that its Google Voice service would
soon be integrated into Hangouts as well.
6http://www.google.com/hangouts/
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2.1.3.4 Viber
Viber is a proprietary cross-platform instant messaging voice-over-Internet Protocol appli-
cation for smartphones developed by Viber Media7. In addition to text messaging, users
can exchange images, video and audio media messages. The client software is available
for Windows, Mac OS, Android, BlackBerry OS, iOS, Series 40, Symbian, Bada, Windows
Phone, Mac OS X and Microsoft Windows. Viber works on both 3G and WiFi networks.
Viber reached 200 million users as of May 7, 2013.
The actual functionality varies from platform to platform with iOS and Android being
the ﬁrst to receive new features. This is because Viber was initially launched for iPhone on
Dec 2 2010, in direct competition with Skype and after that, in July 2012, started releasing
non restricted versions for other OS such us Android, Windows Phone and Symbian.
Viber includes text, picture and video messaging across all platforms, with voice call-
ing available only to iPhone, Android and Nokia's Windows Phone although HD voice is
planned for Windows Phone 8. The application's user interface includes tab bar on the bot-
tom giving access to messages, recent calls, contact, the keypad and a button for accessing
more options. Upon installation, it creates a user account using one's phone number as
username. Viber synchronizes with the phone's address book, so users do not need to add
contacts in a separate book. Since all users are registered with their phone number, the
software returns all Viber users among one's contacts. The newest version of Viber (Version
2.3) has added smileys and other default images.
It has been demonstrated that Viber has many security risks [29]. One of this security
issues is that Viber app for iOS and Android devices contains a SQLite Database with some
xml ﬁles which contain unencrypted conﬁguration data and can be viewed fairly easy.
7http://www.viber.com/
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2.2 Security in Communications
In general, when a communication is established, we want to communicate in a way not
susceptible to eavesdropping or interception, not having a third party to listen in. Commu-
nications security is the discipline of preventing unauthorized interceptors from accessing
telecommunications in an intelligible form, while still delivering content to the intended re-
cipients.
With many communications taking place over long distance and mediated by technol-
ogy, and increasing awareness of the importance of interception issues, technology and its
compromise are at the heart of this debate.
The VoIP technology is based on the previously threatened IP networks and adds tele-
phony threats as well. As the VoIP technology is evolving, it is collecting vulnerabilities and
threats of both Internet and Telecom technologies. The security concept related to VoIP has
many diﬀerent aspects but there are three main fundamentals [Fig. 2.5]: Conﬁdentiality,
Integrity and Availability [32].
Figure 2.5: CIA relationship.
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• Conﬁdentiality: Conﬁdentiality refers to mechanisms ensuring that only intended
recipient have access to the VoIP call. Man-in-the-middle attacks are considered to
be conﬁdentiality breaches including eavesdropping, sniﬃng and application attacks.
ARP monitoring encryption and VPN are some techniques to mitigate such attacks.
• Integrity: Integrity refers to the prevention of any unauthorized modiﬁcation in voice
packets. Any unauthorized activities must be checked upon. Password breaches are
common when a switch reactivates and boots with default settings (Kuhn et al.
2005). Further attacks include IP spooﬁng, quality-degradation, registration/session
hijacking and server insertion attacks (Ramson and Rittinghouse, 2005). Any
rouge packets must be blocked by using VLAN (segmentation), Caller ID veriﬁcation
and ﬁxed routing mechanisms (Green, 2002).
• Availability: Availability refers that the VoIP services is always available when
needed. Denial of Service (DoS) which is a threat to availability could have and
adverse eﬀect if the VoIP call centre network if hit by such attack. Other attacks
include TCP SYN, SIP INVITE ﬂood and Spam over Internet Telephony (SPIT).
Actions needed are using state-full ﬁrewalls, Intrusion detection and spam ﬁlters on
servers.
As introduced, there are many risks associated to VoIP, being classiﬁed in attack cat-
egories. The technology needs to be secured as the packets take an unspeciﬁc route while
traversing from source to destination end. Attacks categories are deﬁned as follows:
• Registration attacks: These attacks happen where the attacker tries to hack into
the system or takes advantage of vulnerabilities in registration injecting themselves
into the signal path of the VoIP network. These kind of attacks include IP Spooﬁng,
Theft of Service, Reﬂection Attack and Brute Force Attack.
• On call attacks: These attacks occur when a person is making or receiving a call. The
attacker intercepts the route where voice/data packets are being sent. Call Hijacking,
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Eavesdropping, ARP spooﬁng, Connection Hijacking and Signal Protocol Tampering
are some of the attacks in this section.
• Denial of Service attacks: These type of attacks have no concern about gaining
any valuable information. Simply isolates the endpoint of network from the rest of the
world by jamming the switches and IP PBX with loads of requests. In this category
also are classiﬁed attacks such as SIP INVITE Flood, TCP SYN Flood and Malicious
RTP Streams.
• Attacks on VoIP components: These attacks are primarily on the devices, as they
seem to be aﬀected easily. The most common attacks are on the IP PBX, softphones
and IP phones.
Due to all kind of attacks that can aﬀect and interfere in VoIP communications it is im-
portant to establish a security policy to design a secure VoIP system which can guarantee
conﬁdential delivery of services to subscribers.
Virtual Lan is a security technology that allows network administrators to logically
divide a LAN into a number un VLANs. This method provides security if any other VLAN
is attacked, others remain safe and secure. VLANs use Segmentation which separates voice
from data VLAN. In VoIP, two diﬀerent VLANs for voice and data could be isolated (if
there is not a dedicated line for voice), by using a layer three segmentation. All the inter
VLAN traﬃc has to pass through the routing device that ﬁlters traﬃc using access control
list.
Virtual Private Network (VPN) is a technology that establishes a private network
within the public network. VPN is based on tunnelling, ensuring the provision of con-
ﬁdentiality and integrity of voice packets in IP technology. VPN technique consists of
encapsulation. Voice traﬃc is secured by encapsulating it inside a tunneling standard. The
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fundamental mechanism behind tunneling is encryption that ensures conﬁdentiality and
data integrity in VoIP networks.
Prior to establishing a connection, tunneling makes use of Authentication Protocol to
set up a trust relationship between the network terminal devices. A symmetric encryptions
algorithms should be preferred for the voice transportation that would help up in speeding
up the process while providing conﬁdentiality. Thus, VPN could use public key cryptogra-
phy. This method is a good choice to counter man-in-the-middle attacks and similar attacks
on voice packets running on VoIP networks.
Mainly there are three subsets of VPN technologies: LAN VPN services, Dial-up VPN
services and Extranet VPN Services [40]. The most popular tunneling standards are Point-
to-Point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP), Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol and IP Security (IPSec).
The major beneﬁt of VoIP based telephony is the ability to encrypt the digital signals
representing the voice stream, being a good defence against call interception. Encryption
allow to have conﬁdential calls, providing end users the certainty that the message delivered
from one end to other regains its secrecy although the voice call is set over a public channel.
Thereby, it is needed to prevent attacks from sniﬀers while making or receiving a call on
the public network using encryption-decryption techniques to address conﬁdentiality issue.
As mentioned earlier, latency is an important issue in many converged and real-time ser-
vices, symmetric encryption algorithms are preferred. This algorithm generates a common
cryptographic key i.e. shared secret key passed on both sides of the channel [Fig. 2.6]. For
example, in IPSec VPN standard, the caller and the callee participating in a voice conver-
sation have to agree previously on a data encryption mechanism included in the standard
such as DES, MD5, SHA along with a shared secret key. It should be noted that DES, MD5,
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Figure 2.6: Symmetric encryption algorithm example.
SHA-0 and SHA-1 have been declared insecure, cryptographically broken and unsuitable for
further use [15][2][34].
DES encryption is now consider insecure due to the 56-bit key size being too small.
In January, 1999, distributed.net and the Electronic Frontier Foundation collaborated to
publicly break a DES key in 22 hours and 15 minutes. There are also some analytical re-
sults which demonstrate theoretical weaknesses in the cipher, although they are infeasible
to mount in practice. The algorithm is believed to be practically secure in the form of Triple
DES, although there are theoretical attacks. In recent years, the cipher has been superseded
by the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). Furthermore, DES has been withdrawn as
a standard by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (formerly the National
Bureau of Standards).
MD5 encryption is not suitable for applications like SSL certiﬁcates or digital signatures
that rely on this property, since has been shown that it is not collision resistant8 [43]. In
1996, a ﬂaw was found with the design of MD5, and while it was not a clearly fatal weakness,
cryptographers began recommending the use of other algorithms, such as SHA-1 (which has
8Collision resistance is a property of cryptographic hash functions: a hash function is collision resistant
if it is hard to ﬁnd two inputs that hash to the same output; that is, two inputs a and b such that H(a) =
H(b), and a 6= b.
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since been found to be vulnerable as well). In 2004, more serious ﬂaws were discovered in
MD5, making further use of the algorithm for security purposes questionable.
Figure 2.7: Public key encryption algorithm example.
If latency is not a big issue, public key cryptography could be used as other encryption
mechanism. This is regarded as the most secure method. In this scenario, the receiver
must obtain the senders public key before any voice connection is established. The sender
encrypts the voice/data with his private key, callee must obtain caller's public key before
establishing a connection. Caller encrypts the voice call with callee public key and sends it
to him. Callee decrypts the voice call and recovers the original voice packets [Fig. 2.7].
In addition to these security technologies, the best to counterattack against registration
problems is authentication. Is is based on cryptography using common secret or public
and private key based methods along with signatures and certiﬁcates. In VoIP scenario, a
voice conversation which is using the public network could give rise to conﬁdentiality and
authentication issues. For example, a person at the end of VoIP conversation could not
prove the authenticity of the caller, as caller can decline the authorship of any calls made by
him. Thereby, as public keys are widely available, any attacker could intercept the encrypted
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data, although he cannot read it but can append any false information or send entirely a
new packet encrypted in receivers public key. Ultimately, the problem domain consists in
ensuring attackers are not able to masquerade the call and proving the callers and message
authentication so that the caller is not able to deny a call made to callee.
Authentication could be provided by diﬀerent means. One of them is that the sub-
scribers can make use of public and private keys to produce digital signatures technique.
The public keys need to be changed before the voice conversation starts. Sender can sign
the voice by using his private key and re-encrypt the result with the receiver's public key,
thus, only receiver could decrypt the information with his private key and then repeat the
same process by using sender's public key. This would provide authentication of the call
that has been generated from the legitimate caller.
Another option could be used by applying MD5. The caller takes the hash of voice
signal and encrypt the original message and the hash with the callee public key. When the
callee receives the call, he decrypts it using his private key and if the hash of the voice sig-
nal is equals to the hash received it means the message is original without any modiﬁcations.
Both of the above techniques could be applied to make the voice conversation more
secure taking into account that the limiting factor is QoS. As follow, it is detailed and open
source software that implements an VPN, providing some of the security aspects needed to
achieve a secure communication.
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2.2.1 OpenVPN
OpenVPN is an open source software application that implements virtual private network
(VPN) techniques for creating secure point-to-point or site-to-site connections in routed or
bridged conﬁgurations and remote access facilities9. It uses a custom security protocol that
uses SSL/TLS for key exchange. It is capable of traversing network address translators
(NATs) and ﬁrewalls. It was written by James Yonan and is published under the GNU
General Public License (GPL).
OpenVPN allows peers to authenticate each other using a pre-shared secret key, certiﬁ-
cates, or username/password. When used in a multiclient-server conﬁguration, it allows the
server to release an authentication certiﬁcate for every client, using signature and Certiﬁcate
authority. It uses the OpenSSL encryption library extensively, as well as the SSLv3/TLSv1
protocol, and contains many security and control features.
This open source software application uses the OpenSSL library to provide encryption
of both the data and control channels. It lets OpenSSL do all the encryption and authenti-
cation work, allowing OpenVPN to use all the ciphers available in the OpenSSL package. It
can also use the HMAC packet authentication feature to add an additional layer of security
to the connection (referred to as an "HMAC Firewall" by the creator)[30].
OpenVPN can run over User Datagram Protocol (UDP) or Transmission Control Proto-
col (TCP) transports, multiplexing created SSL tunnels on a single TCP/UDP port. It has
the ability to work through most proxy servers (including HTTP) and is good at working
through Network address translation (NAT) and getting out through ﬁrewalls. The server
conﬁguration has the ability to "push" certain network conﬁguration options to the clients.
These include IP addresses, routing commands, and a few connection options. OpenVPN
9http://openvpn.net/index.php/access-server/docs/admin-guides.html
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oﬀers two types of interfaces for networking via the Universal TUN/TAP driver. It can
create either a layer-3 based IP tunnel (TUN), or a layer-2 based Ethernet TAP that can
carry any type of Ethernet traﬃc. OpenVPN can optionally use the LZO compression li-
brary to compress the data stream. Port 1194 is the oﬃcial IANA assigned port number for
OpenVPN.
As mentioned, OpenVPN has two authentication modes: Static Key (Use a pre-
shared static key) and TLS (Use SSL/TLS + certiﬁcates for authentication and key ex-
change).
In static key mode, a pre-shared key is generated and shared between both OpenVPN
peers before the tunnel is started. This static key contains 4 independent keys: HMAC
send, HMAC receive, encrypt, and decrypt. By default in static key mode, both hosts will
use the same HMAC key and the same encrypt/decrypt key. However, using the direction
parameter to secret, it is possible to use all 4 keys independently.
In SSL/TLS mode, an SSL session is established with bidirectional authentication (i.e.
each side of the connection must present its own certiﬁcate). If the SSL/TLS authentication
succeeds, encryption/decryption and HMAC key source material is then randomly gener-
ated by OpenSSL's RAND_bytes function and exchanged over the SSL/TLS connection.
Both sides of the connection contribute random source material. This mode never uses any
key bidirectionally, so each peer has a distinct send HMAC, receive HMAC, packet encrypt,
and packet decrypt key. During SSL/TLS rekeying, there is a transition-window parameter
that permits overlap between old and new key usage, so there is no time pressure or latency
bottleneck during SSL/TLS renegotiations.
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OpenVPN can operate on multiple platforms such as Solaris, Linux, OpenBSD, FreeBSD,
NetBSD, QNX, Mac OS X, and Windows 2000/XP/Vista/7. Futhermore, it is available for
mobile phones OSes like Maemo, Windows Mobile 6.5 and below, iOS 3GS+ devices, jail-
broken iOS 3.1.2+ devices and Android 4.0+ devices.
2.3 Speech Quality
Quality of Service (QoS) concept represents a fundamental element in service consumption.
QoS are the performance parameter sets values that ensure acceptable quality levels of ser-
vice to the user. Each kind of service provided has it's own QoS. For example, in traditional
telephony, QoS can be deﬁned as having a 64Kbps channel during the conversation time
and a availability service of 99,999%. Otherwise, in the case of the Internet, heterogeneous
features from the services provided make diﬃcult to identify which are the performance
parameters that ensure acceptable quality levels.
Nowadays, QoS parameters used in the Internet are packet loss, delay, jitter and band-
width among others. All of these parameters aﬀect to voice quality.
There are to many factors that contribute to point-to-point delay such as coding algo-
rithm delay, packaging delay, propagation delay (negligible unless large distances), trans-
mission delay, waiting time in the queues of the network (depending on network traﬃc),
decompression time, etc. The total delay from end to end in a voice call should be kept be-
low a certain level to minimize the interactivity loss between users. ITU-T G.114 standard
speciﬁes a maximum delay level of 150ms between caller and callee.
Packaged voice transport is not only sensible to point-to-point delay, but also to ﬂuc-
tuations in this time delay (jitter). These variations are due to the ﬂuctuations in waiting
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Application Symmetry Point-to-point delay Jitter (ms) Packet loss
Conversation Round trip < 150 ms (preferred)
< 400 ms (maximum)
< 1 s < 3%
Audio streaming One way < 10 s < 1 s < 1%
Voice messages One way < 1 s (play)
< 2 s (record)
< 1 s < 3%
Table 2.2: Maximum values for QoS parameters in voice applications over the Internet
speciﬁed by ITU-T group 12.
time in network nodes that depend on the network current traﬃc. To minimize these jitter
eﬀects it is implemented a packet temporal storage (buﬀers) in the receptor. These buﬀers
also ﬁxed the disordered packet transmission, checking its sequence numbers. However, this
technique increases the ﬁxed total point-to-point delay.
Packet loss is another important factor to take into account in real time services. Since
the VoIP traﬃc is implemented under UDP (RTP over UDP), the only control that can be
applied is in end points. Codecs implement error correction techniques using interpolation
algorithms over the received data to generate loss information. However, when losses ex-
ceed certain threshold (around 3%) or when they appear in bursts, these techniques become
useless.
In Table 2.2, speciﬁed values by ITU-T group 12 for the QoS parameters mentioned
above are shown.
As the Internet (IP technology) provides heterogeneous features from the services, we
cannot establish threshold values for the QoS parameters to ensure the quality of service.
User experience not only depends on network characteristics, but coding, compression and
recovery algorithms. Furthermore, the ﬁnal user (not expert in QoS) may not be interested
in packet loss probability or jitter, but needs a perceived quality estimation about the service
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at issue. Finally, the quality of service will be for a user what he can perceived of it (PQoS),
regardless of the network state.
2.3.1 Perceived Quality of Service (PQoS)
Perceived Quality of Service (PQoS) is the QoS as it is ﬁnally perceived by the end-user.
Perceived Quality Measures could be made using objective o subjective methods [Fig. 2.8].
Subjective methods deﬁne the best accepted metric since represent a direct connec-
tion with users perceived quality. These methods consist in evaluate the mean opinion of a
group of people, presenting them some sequences and each individual gives a quality value.
The inherent problem to this methods is the time needed to accomplished them, high cost
and that they cannot be used to monitor quality in large periods of time. These problems
have made objective methods attractive to estimate the perceived quality in communication
networks.
Objective perceived quality methods can be intrusive and non-intrusive. Extra
signals are necessary to estimate quality in intrusive methods. These methods are more
accurate but usually are not suitable to monitor quality of service, due to the necessity of
using extra signals and the comparison with the original signals.
Non-intrusive methods do not need extra signals and are suitable to monitor quality
of service. Depending on the method's input, they can be classiﬁed into signal-based (the
input is the transmitted signal) or parameter-based (the inputs are communication network
parameters such as bit rate). Objective methods do not give a result in people's opinion,
but its result has correlation with the perceived quality. Thus, it is necessary calibration
based on the subjective method's results.
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Figure 2.8: PQoS methods classiﬁcation.
As follows, all these methods are detailed, giving a general description of each one.
2.3.1.1 Subjective methods
Diﬀerent subjective methods are normalize by ITU in ITU P.800 [20] for audio quality. Ba-
sically, they could be classiﬁed in two kind of test: Absolute Category Rating (ACR)
resultingMean Opinion Score (MOS) andDegradation Category Rating (DCR) result-
ing Degradation Mean Opinion Score (DMOS). These tests are normally taken in controlled
conditions in a laboratory (soundproof rooms).
In ACR test, participants must assign a global quality value to the signal presented, not
having access to the original signal. Quality values are assigned within the Table 2.3. The
mean value assigned by participants is MOS.
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Quality value Signal Quality
5 Excellent
4 Good
3 Fair
2 Poor
1 Bad
Table 2.3: Absolute Category Rating (ACR) quality values relationship.
Codec Bit rate (kbps) MOS Compression Delay (ms))
G.711 (PCM) 64 4.1 0.75
G.726 ADPCM 32 3.85 1
G.728 LD-CELP 16 3.61 3-5
G.729 CS-ACELP 8 3.92 10
G.729 x 2 Encodings 8 3.27 10
G.729 x 3 Encodings 8 2.68 10
G729.a CS-ACELP 8 3.7 10
G.723.1 MP-MLQ 6.3 3.9 30
G.723.1 ACELP 5.3 3.65 30
Table 2.4: Averaged MOS scores for the same sample using diﬀerent audio codecs.
In addition, each codec10 provides a certain quality of speech [Table 2.4][37]. Although it
can seem logical from a ﬁnancial standpoint to convert all calls to low-bit rate codecs to save
on infrastructure costs, exercise additional care when you design voice networks with low-bit
rate compression. There are drawbacks to compressing voice. One of the main drawbacks is
signal distortion due to multiple encodings (called tandem encodings). For example, when
a G.729 voice signal is tandem encoded three times, the MOS score drops from 3.92 (very
good) to 2.68 (unacceptable). Another drawback is codec-induced delay with low bit-rate
codecs.
10PCM = Pulse Code Modulation, ADPCM = Adaptive Diﬀerential Pulse Code Modulation, LDCELP
= Low-Delay Code Excited Linear Prediction, CS-ACELP = Conjugate-Structure Algebraic-Code-Excited
Linear-Prediction, MP-MLQ = Multi-Pulse, Multi-Level Quantization, ACELP = Algebraic Code Excited
Linear Prediction
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Quality value Degradation Level
5 Imperceptible
4 Perceptible but not annoying
3 Slightly annoying
2 Annoying
1 Very annoying
Table 2.5: Degradation Category Rating (DCR) quality degradation relationship.
When signals are of good quality, ACR methods are insensible to little quality changes.
In these cases, DCR methods are used, where two signals are presented to participants, who
must assign a degradation quality value of each other according to Table 2.5. The mean
value assigned by participants is DMOS.
Normally, original signal is presented and then degraded signal (transmitted signal).
2.3.1.2 Objective methods
Intrusive methods usually use two input signals, one as a reference (original signal) and
another one degraded (transmitted signal). They can be classiﬁed in two main groups: Time
Domain Methods and Perception Domain Methods.
Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) and Peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR) are two examples
of Time Domain Methods. This methods are easy to implement, but the correlation with
subjective measures is not good [41][3][42][26][6][38].
Perception Domain Methods make perception relevant measures, transforming signals
to perception domain using human audio perception models. These methods are more com-
plex but present better correlation with subjective methods. Typical Perception Domain
Methods are Perceptual Speech Quality (PSQM), Measuring Normalizing Blocks (MNB),
Enhanced Modiﬁed Bark Spectral Distortion (EMBSD) and Perceptual Evaluation of Speech
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Quality (PESQ). Noteworthy that PESQ includes a alignment mechanism between signals
and gives its quality score in MOS scale.
Non-intrusive methods do not need extra data injection to measure the performance
and audio quality. These methods can be classiﬁed in parameter-based and signal-based
methods. The latter's predict quality only using the degraded signal (NULL reference
method). The former's predict quality from IP network parameters such as packet loss,
jitter, delay and non speciﬁc network parameters as codec, eco, bit rate, etc. Examples of
these methods are E-Model and PSQA.
E-Model is and empirical mathematic model standardized by ITU [23]. E-Model is a
set of formulas that take public switched telephone network (PSTN) parameters and packet
switching network parameters as input and returns the associated quality factor. Although
is a model used for network planning, nowadays is very used to predict perceived quality in
VoIP.
2.4 Cloud Computing
Cloud computing11, often referred to as simply "the cloud", is the delivery of on-demand
computing resources-everything from applications to data centres-over the Internet and on
a pay-for-use basis. A cloud is a powerful combination of computing, networking, storage,
management solutions, and business applications that facilitate a new generation of IT and
consumer services. These services are available on demand and are delivered economically
without compromising security or functionality[28][18].
Cloud computing relies on sharing of resources to achieve coherence and economies of
scale similar to a utility (like the electricity grid) over a network. At the foundation of cloud
11http://www.ibm.com/cloud-computing/us/en/what-is-cloud-computing.html
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computing is the broader concept of converged infrastructure and shared services.
The cloud also focuses on maximizing the eﬀectiveness of the shared resources. Cloud re-
sources are usually not only shared by multiple users but as well as dynamically re-allocated
as per demand. This can work for allocating resources to users in diﬀerent time zones. For
example, a cloud computer facility which serves European users during European business
hours with a speciﬁc application (eg. email) while the same resources are getting reallo-
cated and serve North American users during North America's business hours with another
application (eg. web server). This approach should maximize the use of computing powers
thus reducing environmental damage as well, since less power, air conditioning, rackspace,
and so on, is required for the same functions. The term moving cloud also refers to an
organization moving away from a traditional capex model (Capital expenditures, buy the
dedicated hardware and depreciate it over a period of time) to the opex model (Operational
expenditure, use a shared cloud infrastructure and pay as you use it).
Proponents claim that cloud computing allows companies to avoid upfront infrastruc-
ture costs, and focus on projects that diﬀerentiate their businesses instead of infrastructure.
Proponents also claim that cloud computing allows enterprises to get their applications up
and running faster, with improved manageability and less maintenance, and enables IT to
more rapidly adjust resources to meet ﬂuctuating and unpredictable business demand.
Cloud Computing is the result of evolution and adoption of existing technologies and
paradigms [Fig. 2.9]. The goal of cloud computing is to allow users to take advantage from
all of these technologies, without the need for deep knowledge about or expertise with each
one of them. The cloud aims to cut costs and help the users focus on their core business
instead of being impeded by IT obstacles.
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Figure 2.9: Cloud computing logical diagram.
The main enabling technology for cloud computing is virtualization. Virtualization ab-
stracts the physical infrastructure, which is the most rigid component, and makes it available
as a soft component that is easy to use and manage. By doing so, virtualization provides
the agility required to speed up IT operations, and reduces cost by increasing infrastructure
utilization. On the other hand, autonomic computing automates the process through which
the user can provision resources on-demand. By minimizing user involvement, automation
speeds up the process and reduces the possibility of human errors.
Cloud computing also leverages concepts from utility computing in order to provide
metrics for the services used. Such metrics are at the core of the public cloud pay-per-use
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models. In addition, measured services are an essential part of the feedback loop in auto-
nomic computing, allowing services to scale on-demand and to perform automatic failure
recovery.
Cloud computing is a kind of grid computing; it has evolved from grid computing by
addressing the QoS (quality of service) and reliability problems. Cloud computing provides
the tools and technologies to build data/compute intensive parallel applications with much
more aﬀordable prices compared to traditional parallel computing techniques.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology's deﬁnition of cloud computing
identiﬁes "ﬁve essential characteristics":
• On-demand self-service. A consumer can unilaterally provision computing capa-
bilities, such as server time and network storage, as needed automatically without
requiring human interaction with each service provider.
• Broad network access. Capabilities are available over the network and accessed
through standard mechanisms that promote use by heterogeneous thin or thick client
platforms (e.g., mobile phones, tablets, laptops, and workstations).
• Resource pooling. The provider's computing resources are pooled to serve multiple
consumers using a multi-tenant model, with diﬀerent physical and virtual resources
dynamically assigned and reassigned according to consumer demand. ...
• Rapid elasticity. Capabilities can be elastically provisioned and released, in some
cases automatically, to scale rapidly outward and inward commensurate with demand.
To the consumer, the capabilities available for provisioning often appear unlimited
and can be appropriated in any quantity at any time.
• Measured service. Cloud systems automatically control and optimize resource use
by leveraging a metering capability at some level of abstraction appropriate to the type
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of service (e.g., storage, processing, bandwidth, and active user accounts). Resource
usage can be monitored, controlled, and reported, providing transparency for both the
provider and consumer of the utilized service.
Cloud computing providers oﬀer their services according to several fundamental models
[Fig. 2.10]: infrastructure as a service (IaaS), platform as a service (PaaS), and software
as a service (SaaS) where IaaS is the most basic and each higher model abstracts from the
details of the lower models.
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) is the most basic cloud-service model, where
providers of IaaS, oﬀer computers (physical or more often virtual machines) and other
resources. IaaS clouds often oﬀer additional resources such as a virtual-machine disk image
library, raw (block) and ﬁle-based storage, ﬁrewalls, load balancers, IP addresses, virtual
local area networks (VLANs), and software bundles. IaaS-cloud providers supply these
resources on-demand from their large pools installed in data centres. For wide-area con-
nectivity, customers can use either the Internet or carrier clouds (dedicated virtual private
networks).
To deploy their applications, cloud users install operating-system images and their ap-
plication software on the cloud infrastructure. In this model, the cloud user patches and
maintains the operating systems and the application software. Cloud providers typically
bill IaaS services on a utility computing basis: cost reﬂects the amount of resources allo-
cated and consumed. Typical IaaS providers include: Amazon EC2, AirVM, Azure Services
Platform, DynDNS, Google Compute Engine, HP Cloud, iland, Joyent, LeaseWeb, Linode,
NaviSite, Oracle Infrastructure as a Service, Rackspace, ReadySpace Cloud Services, Reli-
aCloud, SAVVIS, SingleHop, and Terremark.
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In Platform as a Service (PaaS), cloud providers deliver a computing platform typi-
cally including operating system, programming language execution environment, database,
and web server. Application developers can develop and run their software solutions on a
cloud platform without the cost and complexity of buying and managing the underlying
hardware and software layers. With some PaaS oﬀers, the underlying computer and storage
resources scale automatically to match application demand such that cloud user does not
have to allocate resources manually. Examples of PaaS include: AWS Elastic Beanstalk,
Cloud Foundry, Heroku, Force.com, EngineYard, Mendix, OpenShift, Google App Engine,
AppScale, Windows Azure Cloud Services and OrangeScape.
Software as a Service (SaaS) is used in business model where users are provided ac-
cess to application software and databases. Cloud providers manage the infrastructure and
platforms that run the applications. SaaS is sometimes referred to as "on-demand software"
and is usually priced on a pay-per-use basis. SaaS providers generally price applications
using a subscription fee.
In the SaaS model, cloud providers install and operate application software in the cloud
and users access the software from cloud clients. Cloud users do not manage the cloud in-
frastructure and platform where the application runs. This eliminates the need to install and
run the application on the user's own computers, which simpliﬁes maintenance and support.
Cloud applications are diﬀerent from other applications in their scalability (which can be
achieved by cloning tasks onto multiple virtual machines at run-time to meet changing work
demand). Load balancers distribute the work over the set of virtual machines. This process
is transparent to the cloud user, who sees only a single access point. To accommodate a
large number of cloud users, cloud applications can be multi-tenant, that is, any machine
serves more than one cloud user organization. It is common to refer to special types of
cloud based application software with a similar naming convention: desktop as a service,
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business process as a service, test environment as a service, communication as a service.
The pricing model for SaaS applications is typically a monthly or yearly ﬂat fee per user,
so price is scalable and adjustable if users are added or removed at any point. Examples of
SaaS include: Google Apps, Microsoft Oﬃce 365, Petrosoft, Onlive, GT Nexus, Marketo,
Casengo, TradeCard and CallidusCloud.
Proponents claim SaaS allows a business the potential to reduce IT operational costs by
outsourcing hardware and software maintenance and support to the cloud provider. This
enables the business to reallocate IT operations costs away from hardware/software spending
and personnel expenses, towards meeting other goals. In addition, with applications hosted
centrally, updates can be released without the need for users to install new software. One
drawback of SaaS is that the users' data are stored on the cloud provider's server. As a
result, there could be unauthorized access to the data.
Figure 2.10: Cloud computing layers.
With most organizations focusing on leveraging the cloud in order to cut capital expen-
diture and control operating costs, there is aggressive growth in business for cloud adoption.
However, the cloud can bring security risks and challenges for IT Management, which can be
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more expensive for the organization to deal with, even considering the cost saving achieved
by moving to the cloud. Therefore, it is very important for businesses to understand their
requirements before opting for various deployment models available on the cloud.
There are primarily four cloud deployment models [Fig. 2.11], which are discussed be-
low, along with scenarios in which a business could opt for each. These models have been
recommended by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
Figure 2.11: Cloud computing deployment models.
Private cloud is cloud infrastructure operated solely for a single organization, whether
managed internally or by a third-party and hosted internally or externally. Undertaking a
private cloud project requires a signiﬁcant level and degree of engagement to virtualize the
business environment, and requires the organization to reevaluate decisions about existing
resources. This model can improve business, but every step in the project raises security
issues that must be addressed to prevent serious vulnerabilities.
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Public Cloud Private Cloud
Initial cost Typically zero Typically high
Running cost Predictable Unpredictable
Customization Limited Possible
Privacy No Yes
Single sign-on Impossible Possible
Scaling Easy within deﬁned limits Laborious but no limits
Table 2.6: Public and Private cloud models comparison for SaaS.
In a public cloud, services are rendered over a network that is open for public use.
Technically there is no diﬀerence between public and private cloud architecture, however,
security consideration may be substantially diﬀerent for services (applications, storage, and
other resources) that are made available by a service provider for a public audience and
when communication is eﬀected over a non-trusted network. Generally, public cloud service
providers like Amazon AWS, Microsoft and Google own and operate the infrastructure and
oﬀer access only via Internet.
Community cloud shares infrastructure between several organizations from a speciﬁc
community with common concerns (security, compliance, jurisdiction, etc.), whether man-
aged internally or by a third-party and hosted internally or externally. The costs are spread
over fewer users than a public cloud (but more than a private cloud), so only some of the
cost savings potential of cloud computing are realized.
Hybrid Cloud is a composition of two or more clouds (private, community or public)
that remain unique entities but are bound together, oﬀering the beneﬁts of multiple deploy-
ment models. Such composition expands deployment options for cloud services, allowing
IT organizations to use public cloud computing resources to meet temporary needs. This
capability enables hybrid clouds to employ cloud bursting for scaling across clouds. Cloud
bursting is an application deployment model in which an application runs in a private cloud
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or data center and "bursts" to a public cloud when the demand for computing capacity
increases. A primary advantage of cloud bursting and a hybrid cloud model is that an or-
ganization only pays for extra compute resources when they are needed. Therefore, cloud
bursting enables data centres to create an in-house IT infrastructure that supports average
workloads, and use cloud resources from public or private clouds, during spikes in process-
ing demands. By utilizing an hybrid cloud architecture, companies and individuals are
able to obtain degrees of fault tolerance combined with locally immediate usability without
dependency on internet connectivity. Hybrid cloud architecture requires both on-premises
resources and oﬀ-site (remote) server-based cloud infrastructure.
Fig. 2.12 show how each sample services would operate per development model:
Figure 2.12: Sample services operating in cloud models.
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Summarizing, cloud computing, independently from its deployment and service model,
exhibits the following beneﬁts:
• Agility: improves users' ability to re-provision technological infrastructure resources.
• Cost reduction: as infrastructure is typically provided by a third-party and does not
need to be purchased for one-time or infrequent intensive computing tasks. Pricing on
a utility computing basis is ﬁne-grained with usage-based options and fewer IT skills
are required for implementation (in-house).
• Virtualization: allows servers and storage devices to be shared and utilization be
increased. Applications can be easily migrated from one physical server to another.
• Device and location independence: enable users to access systems using a web
browser regardless of their location or what device they are using.
• Multi-tenancy: enables sharing of resources and costs across a large pool of users
thus allowing for centralization of infrastructure (lower costs), peak-load capacity in-
creases and use and eﬃciency improvements for systems that are often underutilized.
• Reliability: improved if multiple redundant sites are used, which makes well-designed
cloud computing suitable for business continuity and disaster recovery.
• Scalability and elasticity: dynamic ("on-demand") provisioning of resources on a
ﬁne-grained, self-service basis near real-time.
• Performance monitoring
• Maintenance: easier because not need to be installed on each user's computer and can
be accessed from diﬀerent places.
On the other hand, security issues concern cloud users due to loss of control over certain
sensitive data, and the lack of security for stored kernels. The complexity of security is
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greatly increased when data is distributed over a wider area or greater number of devices
and in multi-tenant systems that are being shared by unrelated users. In addition, user
access to security audit logs may be diﬃcult or impossible. Private cloud installations are
in part motivated by users' desire to retain control over the infrastructure and avoid losing
control of information security
2.5 Conclusion
Beneﬁts and features of cloud computing like fast deployment, multi-tenancy, reliability,
elasticity and specially cost reduction in given the current economic crisis, makes cloud
attractive to the migration of companies services. Because of 56% of European decision-
makers estimate that the cloud is a priority between 2013 and 2014 [12]. However, a cloud
migration can present numerous challenges such as performance and raise security concerns.
Communication is the most popular use of the Internet. Although most of the technolo-
gies that are unique to the Internet communication are done in text, there is also Internet
telephony. Voice over IP (VoIP) is a methodology and group of technologies for the delivery
of voice communications and multimedia sessions over Internet Protocol (IP) networks, such
as the Internet, being a direct solution to Internet telephony.
Many network parameters like latency, jitter or packet loss directly aﬀect to VoIP com-
munication quality. Moreover, user experience not only depends on network characteristics,
but coding [Table 2.4], compression and recovery algorithms, determining that the quality
of service for a user the quality of service will be for a user what he can perceived of it
(PQoS), regardless of the network state what he can perceived of it (PQoS), regardless of
the network state.
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Perceived Quality of Service (PQoS) measures could be made using objective o sub-
jective methods being subjective methods the best accepted metric since represent a di-
rect connection with users perceived quality. Nevertheless, some objective methods have a
good correlation with subjectives methods such as Perceptual Evaluation of Speech Quality
(PESQ) and Perceptual Evaluation of Audio Quality (PEAQ) [31].
To cover the problem of security in the public cloud and communications, several tech-
nologies and methods coexist to prevent unauthorized interceptors from accessing telecom-
munications in an intelligible form, while still delivering content to the intended recipients.
Encryption, Virtual Lan (VLAN) and Virtual Private Network (VPN) are security technolo-
gies to resolve the three main problems: Conﬁdentiality, Integrity and Availability. VPN is
based on tunnelling, ensuring the provision of conﬁdentiality and integrity of voice packets
in IP technology.Moreover, tunneling makes use of Authentication Protocol prior to estab-
lishing a connection. VPN technique consists of encapsulation. Voice traﬃc is secured by
encapsulating it inside a tunneling standard, whose fundamental mechanism is encryption
that ensures conﬁdentiality and data integrity in VoIP.
In the next chapter, a secure teleconferencing model is presented to cover security issues
in cloud computing and teleconference communication through a public cloud, taking into
account the real-time drawbacks and speech quality in VoIP.
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Chapter 3
Proposal
Security issues are the major concerns about public cloud computing and VoIP. Other is-
sues arising from VoIP and similar real-time software are latency and its repercussion in the
quality of service. Two new teleconferencing secure architectures are presented to overcome
these issues.
Secure teleconferencing architecture models proposed are: VPN Secure Cloud Tele-
conferencing and Hidden Server Secure Cloud Teleconferencing. Moreover, a base-
line model is presented to compare results. The former consists in establishing two VPN
connections to the VoIP teleconference server during a call to ensure conﬁdentiality and
integrity through data encryption [see 4.2]. The latter involves two extra nodes that will act
as ﬁrewalls, ﬁltering and forwarding VoIP traﬃc to the teleconference server [see 4.3]. This
architecture hides Asterisk server, preventing it from DoS and VoIP component attacks [2.2].
To analyse viability, security and real-time traﬃc issues, latency and speech quality are
measured. Speech quality will be estimated with PQoS time domain intrusive objective
methods SNR and PSNR, a perception domain intrusive objective method PESQ and the
MOS subjective method. Correlation between objective methods and MOS will be studied
to determine a speech quality estimator for future work, without necessity of applying MOS
method.
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Instance
Name
Virtual Cores
/ Compute
Units
RAM
Memory
Storage
(GB)
Platform I/O per-
formance
API
Name
Micro 1/up to 2 in
short bursts
615 MiB None (use
Amazon EBS
volumes for
storage)
32/64 bits Very Low t1.micro
Small 1/1 1.7 GiB 160 GB 32/64 bits Low m1.small
Large 2/4 7.5 GiB 2 x 420 GB 64 bits Moderate m1.large
Table 3.1: Amazon Web Services EC2 Instances used for Secure Cloud Teleconferencing
models proposed.
Amazon Web Services EC2 (AWS EC2) will be used as the cloud computing plat-
form. AWS EC2 is a ﬂexible platform with multiple conﬁguration options like operating
systems, type of instances and ﬁrewall and networking. Secure Architectures proposed will
rely over three diﬀerent type of instances: Micro Instances, Small Instances and Large In-
stances [Table 3.1].
Asterisk is chosen as communication application and IP PBX system and will be in-
stalled in AWS EC2 instance server. Asterisk is free and open source and supports a wide
range of Voice over IP protocols. SIP protocol is conﬁgured for VoIP calls. Audio Codec
behaviour will be also analysed, conﬁguring Asterisk server and peers to support four dif-
ferent open source audio codecs to study bit rate and compression delay inﬂuence in Speech
Quality: GSM, G.711 a-law, G.711 µ-law and G.726-32 [Table 3.2].
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Audio Codec Sample Rate Bit rate Latency
GSM 8 KHz 13 kbps 20-30 ms
G.711 a-law 8 KHz 64 kbps 0.125 ms
G.711 µ-law 8 KHz 64 kbps 0.125 ms
G.726-32 8 KHz 32 Kbps 0.125 ms
Table 3.2: Audio Codecs used for Asterisk VoIP PBX.
All peers are Android1 4.0+ devices and use CSipSimple2 client to connect to the
Asterisk server through WiFi networks in their LANs. For VPN connections, peers are con-
ﬁgured with FEAT VPN3 to use 1024 bits public key authentication and SHA-1 algorithm
for encryption.
In the next chapter, VPN Secure Cloud Teleconferencing and Hidden Server Cloud Tele-
conferencing architectures and conﬁguration are presented as well as the baseline model.
1Android is a Linux-based operating system designed primarily for touchscreen mobile devices such as
smartphones and tablet computers. Android is open source and Google releases the code under the Apache
License.
2CSipSimple is a Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) application for Google Android operating system
using the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP). It is open source and free software released under the GNU
General Public License.
3FEAT VPN is an Android application that brings OpenVPN to Android versions 2.1 through 4.2. In
contrast to existing applications, FEAT VPN does not require you to root your Android phone or tablet.
FEAT VPN works on unmodiﬁed oﬀ-the-shelf devices.
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Part II
Experiments and results
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Chapter 4
System Architecture
VPN Secure Cloud Teleconferencing and Hidden Server Secure Cloud Teleconferencing ar-
chitecture proposed models and the baseline architecture (Basic Architecture) are set in
AWS EC2 public cloud and launched in US-east-1d zone. All instances run a 64bit 12.10
Ubuntu1 operating system. Some considerations need to be taken about the deployed As-
terisk server in all architectures.
As Asterisk has been chosen as IP PBX and communication platform, it has to be
installed and conﬁgured in the server. SIP protocol is conﬁgured through sip.conf ﬁle as
follows:
• UDP protocol is enabled.
• canreinvite/directmedia: oﬀ. Every packet passes through the Asterisk server, not
allowing direct connection once communication is established.
• qualify: yes. Enabled to do not let ﬁrewalls and routers delete routes.
• alwaysauthreject: yes. Reject bad authentication requests on valid usernames with the
1Ubuntu is a computer operating system based on the Debian Linux distribution and distributed as
free and open source software, using its own desktop environment. As of 2012, according to online surveys,
Ubuntu is the most popular Linux-based operating system on desktop/laptop personal computers, and most
Ubuntu coverage focuses on its use in that market. However, it is also popular on servers and for cloud
computing.
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same rejection information as with invalid usernames, denying remote attackers the
ability to detect existing extensions with brute-force guessing attacks.
• tos (terms of service): 0x18. Low delay and high throughput are set.
• NAT is enabled for peers but set to 'route' for the Asterisk server.
• Peers' password must be strong2[7][19][13][35].
• SIP port is set to UDP 5060.
• Allowed Audio Codecs are GSM, G.711 a-law, G.711 µ-law and G.726-32 [Table 3.2].
Extra security measures could be set only accepting calls from determined IPs and denying
all the rest, disabling ICMP echo-request, limiting established connections and new connec-
tions per minute to avoid DoS attacks and only opening both in the Asterisk server and in
the AWS EC2 ﬁrewall ports: 5060 UDP (SIP protocol), 10000-20000 UDP (RTP protocol)
and 1194 TCP (OpenVPN protocol, just for VPN Secure Cloud Teleconferencing Architec-
ture).
Public cloud platform (AWS EC2) is considered secure, not the case of the rest of the
network (Internet and LANs), considered an unsafe environment and attack susceptible.
2Strong passwords guidelines:
 Minimum password length of 12 to 14 characters.
 Generating passwords randomly where feasible.
 Avoiding passwords based on repetition, dictionary words, letter or number sequences, usernames,
relative or pet names, romantic links (current or past), or biographical information (e.g., ID numbers,
ancestors' names or dates).
 Including numbers, and symbols in passwords if allowed by the system.
 If the system recognizes case as signiﬁcant, using capital and lower-case letters.
 Avoiding using the same password for multiple sites or purposes.
 Avoiding using something that the public or workmates know you strongly like or dislike.
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CSipSimple (SIP VoIP client for Android OS) is installed and conﬁgured in all peers
(Android 4.0+ devices). Audio Codecs allowed are GSM, G.711 a-law, G.711 µ-law and
G.726-32 and voice calls are automatically recorded. Each single VoIP client is previously
signed up in the Asterisk server. Moreover, echo cancellation is enabled to avoid interfer-
ences and bad results.
In the next sections, proposed architectures are widely described as well as their partic-
ular conﬁguration options if needed.
4.1 Basic Cloud Teleconferencing Architecture
The baseline cloud teleconference architecture consists in an Asterisk VoIP server launched
in the AWS EC2 public cloud (speciﬁcally in US-east-1d zone). As mentioned in Chapter
4, every peer has previously been signed up in the Asterisk server, being able to call to oth-
ers registered peers. For the further experiments, the architecture setup is shown in Fig. 4.1.
Figure 4.1: Basic Cloud Teleconferencing Architecture.
In Basic Cloud Teleconferencing Architecture [Fig. 4.1], no encryption or hidden server
are set. Every peer can establish a VoIP communication to any of the rest of the peers
without restriction. No extra parameters need to be conﬁgured both in the Asterisk server
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and peers. This Basic Architecture will be a baseline to compare results with the proposed
secure cloud architectures for VoIP teleconference.
4.2 VPN Secure Cloud Teleconferencing Architecture
The ﬁrst proposal that addresses security issues in public clouds and communication is VPN
Secure Cloud Teleconferencing Architecture. As the Basic Architecture, Asterisk VoIP server
is launched in the AWS EC2 public cloud and peers are previously signed up.
Furthermore, OpenVPN and OpenSSL (SSL/TLS public key authentication) must be in-
stalled on the Asterisk server to provide VPN tunneling. An SSL session is established with
bidirectional authentication between peers before a call (i.e. each side of the connection must
present its own certiﬁcate). If the SSL/TLS authentication succeeds, encryption/decryption
and HMAC key source material is then randomly generated by OpenSSL's RAND_bytes
function and exchanged over the SSL/TLS connection. Both sides of the connection con-
tribute random source material. This mode never uses any key bidirectionally, so each peer
has a distinct send HMAC, receive HMAC, packet encrypt, and packet decrypt key. Au-
thentication certiﬁcates are generated of 1024 bits and SHA-1 encryption algorithm is used
for voice data encryption. Authentication certiﬁcates are installed in peers once generated
in the Asterisk-OpenVPN server and before establishing an VPN connection and a VoIP call.
The VPN Secure Cloud Teleconferencing Architecture setup is illustrated in Fig. 4.2,
where each peer establish it's own VPN connection to the server before calling. VPN con-
nections will be closed when VoIP call ends.
VPN Secure Cloud Teleconferencing Architecture resolves Authentication, Integrity and
Conﬁdentiality issues related to the security concept of VoIP [Table 2.5]. VPN Secure Cloud
Teleconferencing Architecture prevent VoIP calls from attacks [see 2.2] such as:
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Figure 4.2: VPN Secure Cloud Teleconferencing Architecture.
• Registration attacks: covered by VPN public key based authentication.
• On call attacks: eavesdropping, sniﬃng, man-in-the-middle are solved by VPN en-
cryption.
• Denial of Service attacks: these attacks are prevented by limiting the number of
connections per minute and the total connections, denying no friend IPs, etc. [see 4].
However this architecture does not prevent from attacks on VoIP components such as
the Asterisk server. Asterisk/OpenVPN server IP address is needed to establish a VoIP call,
being know from all peer clients.
FEAT VPN is installed on Android peers to provide VPN connection with the server.
Certiﬁcates and conﬁguration ﬁles have been previously moved and installed on all clients.
Due to the VPN protocol (encryption/decryption and control ﬂow data) delay issues
may occur, aﬀecting the perceived quality of service (PQoS). This repercussion needs to be
studied to verify the VPN extra data load viability.
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4.3 Hidden Server Secure Cloud Teleconferencing Archi-
tecture
The second proposed architecture is Hidden Server Secure Cloud Teleconferencing Archi-
tecture, establishing the Asterisk server in the AWS EC2 public cloud (US-east-1d zone).
Two new instances (End Points) need to be launched in the same zone to complete the
architecture. These instances will be always micro instances to reduce costs and will act as
ﬁrewalls, hiding the server from the peers (VoIP clients) and forwarding VoIP traﬃc. Note
that as in the other architectures, peers are previously signed up in the Asterisk server.
Figure 4.3: Hidden Server Secure Cloud Teleconferencing Architecture.
The Hidden Server Secure Cloud Teleconferencing Architecture setup is presented in Fig.
4.3. Socat is conﬁgured to create a new thread in the End Point per each new call and thus
improve the performance of the End Point.
As End Points act like ﬁrewalls, socat3 is installed in them to forward SIP control ﬂow
(port 5060) and RTP packets that contain voice traﬃc. End Points only forward pack-
3Socat is a command line based utility that establishes two bidirectional byte streams and transfers data
between them. Because the streams can be constructed from a large set of diﬀerent types of data sinks and
sources, and because lots of address options may be applied to the streams, socat can be used for many
diﬀerent purposes.
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ets from peers, denying packets from other sources. Establishing the End Points between
peers and the Asterisk server, attacks on VoIP server are prevented due to the server IP
address ignorance. Peers perform its SIP authentication and VoIP communication against
End Points and not against the Asterisk server, only needing to know the server IP Address.
Although attacks on VoIP components are prevented in this architecture (as well as DoS
attacks, see 4), there is neither data encryption nor secure authentication. Attacks that
were cover in VPN Secure Cloud Teleconferencing Architecture such as registration attacks
and on call attacks are not addressed.
In the following chapters, the proposed architectures are tested, extracting results to
establish conclusions about security, performance and potential future work.
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Chapter 5
Experiments
To test proposed architectures and could take conclusions about them in terms of security,
costs and performance, a test plan must be deﬁne. Moreover, a new ratio must be deﬁned
to evaluate cost against the performance received.
5.1 Infrastructure
Proposed architectures and their particular conﬁguration [see Chapter 4] have been deployed
for its analysis. In each architecture, needed instances have been launched and conﬁgurated
according to their particular security conditions.
Besides proposed architectures, other network parameters that aﬀect the PQoS, need to
be ﬁxed before testing. Although Internet network conditions are unpredictable and can not
Upload speed (kbps) Download speed (kbps) Delay (ms)
Day 1 241 2561 153
Day 2 264 2543 90
Day 3 260 2575 130
Day 4 265 2591 137
Day 5 265 2724 132
Average 259 2598.8 126.4
Table 5.1: Experimental WiFi LAN Network Conditions.
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be establish, WiFi local network conditions from where peers connect to Asterisk server,
could be determined. In Table 5.1, real WiFi LAN network conditions where measured
during the testing week, taking a sample each day before testing. Tests are performed over
24 Mbps WiFi local networks to which peers are connected.
Initial tests yielded issues. Android mobile devices with lower performance than a 400
MHz processor do not computationally support FEAT VPN and CSipSimple execution
at the same time. To prevent this initial issue, all peers will have at least the following
speciﬁcations and applications installed:
• 1 GHz processor
• 1 GB RAM
• 50 MB of free storage
• Android 4.0+ OS
• FEAT VPN release 38
• CSipSimple 1.00.00 release 2225
• CSipSimple codec pack version 1.2 (for G.726 audio codec)
In the next section, test methodology is explained once the infrastructure is deployed
and previous conﬁgurations are set.
5.2 Methodology
Once the infrastructures of the two proposed architectures are set, peers connect to the
architecture to start testing. Depending on which architecture is deployed, peers connect
in one way or another. If Basic Cloud Teleconferencing Architecture is deployed, peers use
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CSipSimple to connect to the Asterisk server (through the server public IP address), regis-
tering with its caller id and its password. However, if VPN Secure Cloud Teleconferencing
Architecture is deployed, peers ﬁrst establish a VPN connection using FEAT VPN appli-
cation and the public key certiﬁcates (previously provided) to connect to the VoIP server.
Once connected through the VPN, peers register in the VoIP server via the private address
provided in the established VPN connection, using CSipSimple. On the other hand, if Hid-
den Server Secure Cloud Teleconferencing Architecture is deployed, peers are registered in
the End Points through the End Points public IP address and ignoring Asterisk server IP
address.
For each kind of architecture, Asterisk server (Asterisk + OpenVPN server in VPN Secure
Cloud Teleconferencing Architecture) is instanced with the three AWS instance types chosen:
micro, small and large [Table 3.1]. Moreover, for each kind of Asterisk server instance, tests
are made using the four audio codecs chosen: GSM, G.711 a-law, G.711 µ-law and G.726-32
[Table 3.2]. Architectures are tested using 2, 4, 6 and 8 peers to study quality degradation.
A test experiment consist of the following steps:
• Depending on the number of peers being tested, peers register and all except two,
establish a call in pairs from one LAN to the other with the current audio codec. The
two remaining peers (one of each LAN) enable auto call recording and are placed in
locked rooms without environmental noise.
• One of these two peers made a 10 seconds long call to the other one, divided in this
sections:
 First 1.5 seconds: silence.
 Next 7 seconds say the following sentence in Spanish: "Estoy probando el proyecto
de ﬁn de máster. Estoy llamando a la extensión doscientos dos."
 Last 1.5 seconds: silence.
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• As auto call recording is enabled, emitted and received audio are recorded in WAV
ﬁles to future analysis.
Once experiments are taken, emitted and received audio WAV ﬁles of each situation
need to be processed. To extract SNR and PSNR values of each pair of emitted and re-
ceived audio piece, WAVdiﬀ1 program is used. Furthermore, for speech quality analysis,
PESQ algorithm is used. PESQ algorithm has been download from ITU webpage[21] and
a wrapper[45] has been used to allow Matlab access to PESQ ITU's algorithm. This PESQ
wrapper provides PESQ and PESQ-LQO values, being chosen the latter to easily compare
with MOS scale. Also four people where asked to rank every received audio ﬁle in MOS
scale, taking as result the average of the four scores. These people were asked to rank each
audio received ﬁle in a closed room without any environmental noise.
In the next chapter, collected results are shown along with brief descriptions and com-
ments of each.
1The WD (WavDiﬀ) is a command-line tool for audio ﬁle comparison and statistical analysis. This
tool accepts wav or raw PCM formats, provides fast automatic alignment, can compare ﬁles with diﬀerent
precision, for example IEEE double with 16-bit PCM and saves diﬀerence or aligned ﬁle.
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Chapter 6
Results
Proposed architectures were tested by the methodology and the infrastructure described in
the previous section. As MOS, PESQ, PSNR and SNR where measured per each pair of
emitted and received audio, correlation between these metrics and MOS where analysed to
see if any of them would be a good speech quality estimator.
SNR and PSNR have a extremely low correlation with MOS scores as shown in Table 6.1.
SNR and PSNR would not be good speech quality estimators with these results. However,
analysing PESQ and MOS correlation, PESQ has a correlation ratio of nearly 0.78, being
an acceptable estimator for speech quality. As we have MOS scores per each situation and
as it is the best metric to evaluate and determine speech quality, it is set to analyse the
impact of security and network conditions in speech quality.
Delay eﬀect in speech quality (MOS) has been also studied, being analysing in terms of
Correlation
SNR-MOS 0.07
PSNR-MOS 0.06
PESQ-MOS 0.78
Table 6.1: SNR, PSNR and PESQ MOS correlation.
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type of architecture, kind of instance and number of peers. As we can see in Fig. 6.1, delay
does not aﬀect in a uniform way to speech quality (a higher delay does not imply lower
quality), although more low MOS scores are given with high delay. Moreover, delay impact
is higher in VPN Secure Cloud Teleconferencing Architecture.
Figure 6.1: Delay impact per cloud teleconferencing architecture.
Similar results have been obtained in terms of kind of instance [Fig. 6.2]. Large instances
are more inﬂuenced by delay that the Micro and Small instances.
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Figure 6.2: Delay impact per kind of Amazon Web Services Instance.
Regarding the number of peers, latency impact increases with the number of peers as
shown in Fig. 6.3. The more number of peers, the more latency aﬀects speech quality.
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Figure 6.3: Delay impact per number of peers.
In the next subsections, speech quality collected results are presented by number of peers,
architecture and audio codec. Furthermore, a new metric is ﬁxed to study the architecture
deployment costs and the speech quality obtained.
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6.1 Speech Quality Results
Speech Quality values are presented by the number of peers for better comprehension. MOS
quality values are shown per each proposed architecture according each audio codec.
Figure 6.4: Reference and degraded signal in an VPN Secure Cloud Architecture in a Large
instance with 2 peers using G.711 µ-law audio codec and getting a MOS score of 4.75
In Fig. 6.4 and Fig. 6.5 reference and degraded signal with an excellent and a very
bad MOS score are presented respectively. Signal amplitude in the degraded signal with
excellent MOS score [Fig. 6.4] almost overlaps reference signal amplitude, being signiﬁcantly
lower the degraded signal with low MOS score.
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Figure 6.5: Reference and degraded signal in an VPN Secure Cloud Architecture in a Small
instance with 6 peers using G.711 µ-law audio codec and getting a MOS score of 2.
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6.1.1 2 peers Speech Quality
According to the results presented in Fig. 6.6, an instance with better performance does not
represent a PQoS substantial improvement in Basic Cloud Teleconferencing Architecture.
Figure 6.6: Speech Quality in Basic Cloud Teleconferencing Architecture with 2 peers.
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In contrast, both VPN and Hidden Server Secure Cloud Teleconferencing Architectures,
Micro instances provide slightly less MOS than Small and Large Instances as we can see in
Fig. 6.7 and Fig. 6.8. The audio codec that provides better speech quality in most cases is
G.711 µ-law.
Figure 6.7: Speech Quality in VPN Secure Cloud Teleconferencing Architecture with 2
peers.
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Figure 6.8: Speech Quality in Hidden Server Secure Cloud Teleconferencing Architecture
with 2 peers.
6.1.2 4 peers Speech Quality
Basic Cloud Teleconferencing Architecture provides slightly less MOS in general [Fig. 6.9]
than the proposed Architectures in spite of the extra load security when connecting 4 peers
to the architectures. GSM audio codec gives less speech quality than G.711 a-law or G.711
µ-law in all cases, being the latters the audio codecs that provides the best speech quality
in most cases.
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Figure 6.9: Speech Quality in Basic Cloud Teleconferencing Architecture with 4 peers.
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Figure 6.10: Speech Quality in VPN Secure Cloud Teleconferencing Architecture with 4
peers.
Using Micro instances, speech quality degrades more in VPN Architecture than in Basic
or Hidden Server Architecture [Fig. 6.10]. When instance's computing capacity is enhanced,
this degradation disappears. Unlike the Basic and Hidden Server Architecture, G.726 audio
codec provides the same audio quality than G.711 codecs.
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Figure 6.11: Speech Quality in Hidden Server Secure Cloud Teleconferencing Architecture
with 4 peers.
6.1.3 6 peers Speech Quality
Micro Instances provides a signiﬁcant less speech quality with all codecs when using 6 peers
as shows Fig. 6.12 and Fig. 6.14 in comparison with Small and Large instances for all archi-
tectures. Indeed, in VPN architecture using Micro or Small Instances with 6 peers, quality
degradation is very high, giving MOS values lower than fair quality (lower than three).
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Figure 6.12: Speech Quality in Basic Cloud Teleconferencing Architecture with 6 peers.
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Figure 6.13: Speech Quality in VPN Secure Cloud Teleconferencing Architecture with 6
peers.
Unlike regular situations where G.711 codecs gives better MOS scores, when Micro and
Small instances are overload in VPN architecture using 6 peers, GSM and G.726 audio
codecs provide better results than G.711 audio codes [Fig 6.13].
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Figure 6.14: Speech Quality in Hidden Server Secure Cloud Teleconferencing Architecture
with 6 peers.
6.1.4 8 peers Speech Quality
Speech quality considerably degrades in Micro and Small instances for all architectures when
using 8 peers, being this degradation more signiﬁcant than when using 6 peers. Large in-
stances are not aﬀected by connecting 8 peers, giving MOS scores similar to situations of 6,
4 and 2 peers.
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Figure 6.15: Speech Quality in Basic Cloud Teleconferencing Architecture with 8 peers.
As illustrated in Fig. 6.16, Micro and Small instances completely saturate using 8 peers
in a VPN Architecture, hanging out as many as communications needed to overcome this
saturation. Because of this, these results have not been included due to they are not signif-
icant to be cut some communications.
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Figure 6.16: Speech Quality in VPN Secure Cloud Teleconferencing Architecture with 8
peers. Micro and Small instances do not present results due to its saturation.
G.711 audio codecs give better speech quality than the rest is most cases. However,
in overload and saturation scenarios, G.726 audio codec gives same or better results than
G.711 [Fig. 6.16 and Fig. 6.17].
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Figure 6.17: Speech Quality in Hidden Server Secure Cloud Teleconferencing Architecture
with 8 peers.
6.1.5 Discussion
According to the obtained results, Large instances only provide better performance in satu-
rated and overloaded scenarios, that is when using 6 or 8 peers. VPN architecture has lower
performance than the others architectures, being likely due to the encryption and control
ﬂow extra load.
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In general, audio codecs which gives better performance and speech quality are G.711
a-law and G.711 µ-law. Nevertheless, in overloaded and saturated scenarios, G.726 audio
codec provides same or better results than G.711.
In regular scenarios (2 and 4 peers in Hidden Server Architecture), with neither overload
nor saturation, instance type does not aﬀect to the performance.
6.2 Deployment Cost-Speech Quality Results
It is proposed a new ratio to evaluate the performance against infrastructure costs. Infras-
tructure costs are in terms of price per kind of instance per hour. For the three selected
instances hourly price is illustrated in Table 6.2.
Cost-Performance ratio is deﬁned as follows:
Rcp =
price_per_hour
MOS
Note that in Hidden Server Architecture, two Micro instances are launched for acting like
End Points (ﬁrewalls), so in this architecture this cost needs to be added to the Asterisk
server instance price.
For better comprehension and visual perception Rcp ratio has been multiplied by 100 in
the following ﬁgures and illustrations.
Rcp values are presented by the number of peers for better comprehension. Rcp score is
illustrated per each proposed architecture according each audio codec. The lower Rcp score,
the better in terms of cost and its performance will the scenario be.
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Type of Instance Price per hour
Micro $0,020
Small $0,060
Large $0,240
Table 6.2: Price per hour for AWS selected instances in US-east zone for Linux OS.
6.2.1 2 peers Deployment Cost-Speech Quality
Figure 6.18: Rcp for Basic Cloud Teleconferencing Architecture with 2 peers.
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Both in Basic as in VPN and Hidden Server Architecture, a better instance performance
with its associated cost does not guarantee better speech quality results when using 2 peers
[Fig. 6.18, Fig. 6.19 and Fig. 6.20]. In addition, in Large instances Rcp score soars, indicat-
ing that it is not worth spending money in Large instances comparing to the speech quality
received.
Figure 6.19: Rcp for VPN Secure Cloud Teleconferencing Architecture with 2 peers.
As is section 6.1.1, G.711 codecs provide better speech quality results, but also G.726
codec gives as good results. In a scenario with an Hidden Server Architecture deployed
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and 2 peers, Rcp values raise because it is necessary to add two extra Micro instances (End
Points) to deploy the whole infrastructure and this raises costs [Fig. 6.20].
Figure 6.20: Rcp for Hidden Server Secure Cloud Teleconferencing Architecture with 2
peers.
97
6.2.2 4 peers Deployment Cost-Speech Quality
Figure 6.21: Rcp for Basic Cloud Teleconferencing Architecture with 4 peers.
In case of connecting 4 peers at the same time, Micro instances will be the best choice in
terms of Rcp ratio since it is not worth spending more money in better instances as these
do not guarantee better speech quality.
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Figure 6.22: Rcp for VPN Secure Cloud Teleconferencing Architecture with 4 peers.
As in the previous case (connecting 2 peers), the best audio codec is G.711 µ-law in all
the scenarios, giving better speech quality than the rest of the audio codecs with the same
cost in each architecture. Again, Rcp values raise in Hidden Server Architecture due to the
two extra instances cost.
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Figure 6.23: Rcp for Hidden Server Secure Cloud Teleconferencing Architecture with 4
peers.
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6.2.3 6 peers Deployment Cost-Speech Quality
Figure 6.24: Rcp for Basic Cloud Teleconferencing Architecture with 6 peers.
VPN architecture gets overloaded when using 6 peers in Micro and Small instances [see sec-
tion 6.1.3]. In Fig. 6.25 it is shown that diﬀerences between Micro instances Rcp scores and
Small instances Rcp scores increase compared to the same scenario using 4 peers. System
gets overloaded and provides same fair-low quality results for the two instances, not being
worth spending more in acquire better instances.
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Figure 6.25: Rcp for VPN Secure Cloud Teleconferencing Architecture with 6 peers.
In Hidden Server Architecture, Rcp values of Micro and Small instances get closer [Fig.
6.26]. This is because enhancing instance features in this kind of architecture connecting
6 peers, a better quality is received. G.711 µ-law audio codec in regular conditions and
G.726 in overload conditions [Micro and Small instances in Fig. 6.25], provide better speech
quality with the same cost than the rest of codecs.
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Figure 6.26: Rcp for Hidden Server Secure Cloud Teleconferencing Architecture with 6
peers.
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6.2.4 8 peers Deployment Cost-Speech Quality
Figure 6.27: Rcp for Basic Cloud Teleconferencing Architecture with 8 peers.
As in the previous scenarios, Micro instances continue being the best choice in terms of cost
per quality of service [Fig. 6.27 and Fig. 6.29]. However, in Hidden Server Architecture, as
happened connecting 6 peers, Rcp scores get closer because better speech quality is obtained
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when instance features are enhanced.
Figure 6.28: Rcp for VPN Secure Cloud Teleconferencing Architecture with 8 peers.
Rcp score are not presented in Fig. 6.28 in case of connecting 8 peers to VPN architectures
due to system saturation with Micro and Small instances, so in this case, the only possibility
would be acquire a Large instance. In contrast with the previous results in high degradation
scenarios as in Fig. 6.28, G.726 audio codec gives better speech quality results for the same
deployment costs.
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Figure 6.29: Rcp for Hidden Server Secure Cloud Teleconferencing Architecture with 8
peers.
6.2.5 Discussion
In a global outline according to the new established metric Rcp, Micro Instances are much
cheaper, providing similar quality of service and performance than Small and Large Instances
in scenarios with 2 or 4 peers. In scenarios with 6 peers, depending on the architecture, a
Micro or Small instance would be a better choice. For example, for Hidden Server Architec-
ture with 6 peers, Small instance would be suitable instead of Micro instance if quality is
much important than cost. Finally, for 8 peers situations, neither Micro nor Small instances
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can establish calls in VPN architectures, being necessary to use Large instances. However,
when deploying Hidden Server Architecture with 8 peers, as happened with 6 peers, Small
instances would be a better choice than Micro instances if quality of service is more impor-
tant than deployment costs.
Regarding the audio codecs, G.711 codecs give better speech quality for the same scenario
than G.726 and GSM for non overloaded and saturated systems. On the other hand, G.726
and GSM codecs are better for overloaded and saturated situations as illustrated in Fig.
6.25.
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Chapter 7
Model
According to the results and the later discussion, an infrastructure decision tree can be
obtained based on user preferences [Fig. 7.1]. This model shows a decision tree whose steps
are in the same way as results were illustrated: number of peers, kind of architecture, type
of instance and ﬁnally, audio codec. Lower than 3.5 MOS values would be consider a non
acceptable quality of service.
The infrastructure decision tree ﬂow goes as follows:
1. The decision process starts in determine the number of peers that will be used within
the secure cloud teleconferencing architecture.
2. Once the number of peers is ﬁxed, user needs to decide what it is more important
security or performance, and establish if peers are in a secure environment. When
these decisions are taken, Secure Cloud Architecture is set, choosing between VPN or
Hidden Server Secure Cloud Teleconferencing Architecture.
3. After ﬁxing the number of peers and the architecture, the type of instance is set based
on the cost, performance or both (Rcp).
4. Audio codec is automatically set after the three previous steps, ﬁxing the audio codec
that provides better speech quality for the scenario.
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Figure 7.1: Secure Cloud Infrastructure decision tree.
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With this model, an user who wants to deploy a secure cloud teleconferencing infras-
tructure can easily decide which is the best option for him just answering a couple of basic
questions that will determine the most suitable codec, security and architecture according
to his necessities.
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Part III
Conclusions and future work
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Chapter 8
Contributions
This chapter discusses what are the main contributions of the project and draws some con-
clusions about the work carried out.
In accordance to the correlation results between SNR, PNR and PESQ with MOS, the
only acceptable VoIP QoS estimator is PESQ with a correlation of nearly 0.78. On the other
hand, SNR and PSNR are not valid QoS estimators, both with an extremely poor correla-
tion around 0.07. These behaviours are similar to the results and conclusions achieved in
previous works[41][3][42][26][6][38].
Network latency does not aﬀect in a uniform way to speech quality (a higher delay does
not imply lower quality), although more low MOS scores are given with high delay. More-
over, delay impact is higher in VPN Secure Cloud Teleconferencing Architecture. Despite
the maximum point-to-point delay in VoIP communications deﬁned by ITU (between a pre-
ferred delay of 150ms and a maximum of 400ms) [Table 2.2], higher latency values continue
getting high quality results (more than 3.75 MOS values).
The minimum MOS value QoS for the proposed architectures is set to 3.5. Other VoIP
applications such as Skype or GTalk do not exceed a 3.75 MOS value, even with excellent
network conditions with a delay lower than 50 ms [33][27][44]. The proposed architectures,
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in spite of the security measures overload, provide higher QoS, reaching excellent speech
quality levels above 4 MOS scores. Although Skype and GTalk (now Google+ Hangouts)
have millions of users, the proposed secure architectures could adopt and elastic and dis-
tributed infrastructure in the cloud to provide service to users depending on demand.
The main contribution of this work is the proposal of two Secure Cloud Teleconferencing
Architectures, VPN Secure Cloud Teleconferencing Architecture and Hidden Server Secure
Cloud Teleconferencing Architecture, to cover security issues in public clouds and Internet
Communications. These architectures deﬁne which security model, cloud instances infras-
tructure and audio codec to use to achieve the best performance while preventing of security
breaches and the risks associated to VoIP. VPN Secure Cloud Teleconferencing Architecture
can prevent from registration, on call and denial of service attacks. On the other hand, Hid-
den Server Secure Cloud Teleconferencing Architecture can prevent from denial of service
attacks and attacks to VoIP main component, Asterisk server.
These proposed architectures are reﬂected in a secure cloud teleconferencing infrastruc-
ture decision tree, where users who need to deploy a secure cloud VoIP architecture can
easily choice the best option according to their preferences in terms of cost, security and
performance. This model determines from the user's answers to three questions, the most
suitable secure architecture, type of AWS to use and the best audio codec to achieve better
QoS.
Now, all eﬀorts can be focused on the Asterisk server elasticity to fully validate the
proposed architectures and the model.
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Chapter 9
Future work
The proposed Secure Cloud Teleconferencing Architectures solve security breaches in public
cloud and Internet communications addressing the concept of security in VoIP based on
three fundamentals: Conﬁdentiality, Integrity and Availability. Each proposed architecture
solves some of the VoIP attacks identiﬁed but not all, being essential a security improvement
to deal with all possible VoIP attacks. Future work from a security perspective includes:
• A combination between VPN and Hidden Server Secure Cloud Telecon-
ferencing Architecture. VPN Architecture prevents from registration, on call and
denial of service attacks and Hidden Server Architecture prevents from denial of service
attacks and attacks on VoIP Server. A combination between these two architectures
would prevent from the four attacks [see section 2.2]. This new architecture has not
been addressed in this work due to the problems related to NAT and SIP protocol.
• Designing other secure architectures with diﬀerent kinds of encryption and/or
authentication and how aﬀects to QoS. For example, RSA for asymmetric cyphering
will add extra computation time to OpenVPN server but will not have to deal with
control ﬂow of VPN architectures. On the other hand, symmetric cyphering methods
like AES, DES or TDEA will improve computation time of encryption/decryption,
but are less secure and more susceptible to be attacked.
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On the other hand, from an infrastructure perspective, cloud secure architectures need
to evolve including some of the following features:
• An scalable and distributed VoIP server. Deploying an scalable and distributed
Asterisk server would provide a better QoS and save costs, adapting on demand the
Asterisk servers to the needs of the moment.
• On demand security and deployment. An architecture that diﬀerentiates security
according to network infrastructure and application would avoid an unnecessary drain
on IT resources by protecting each communication at just the right level[24]. Moreover,
an architecture that is able to deploy end points and VoIP server in the nearest AWS
zones to clients would improve latency issues.
Furthermore, including other kind of wireless and mobile networks (such as 3G and the
4G) as well as including a higher number of peers will enrich this study and the secure cloud
teleconferencing infrastructure decision tree.
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